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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation contains empirical studies on various finance topics.  In the first chapter, 
entitled ―Signaling and Value Creation in Mergers,‖ I analyze the acquirers in both withdrawn 
and completed merger deals to disentangle the effects of signaling from those of target valuation 
and expected synergies.  Completed stock (cash) acquirers earn 14 percent (10 percent) more 
than their withdrawn counterparts over the six months following initial announcement.  These 
results suggest that the initial negative stock price reaction in stock mergers is due to a signaling 
effect, but that the mergers themselves are positive NPV investments for the acquirers‘ 
shareholders.  In the second chapter of this dissertation, entitled ―Option Market Overreaction to 
Stock Price Changes,‖ my coauthors and I examine the relationship between implied volatility of 
individual options on S&P 100 stocks and the ex-post realized volatility of the stocks following 
sharp movements in the underlying stock prices.  We find that the implied volatility is 
significantly higher than the realized volatility, and construct profitable trading strategies based 
on this finding.  We believe that we are the first to document a successful trading strategy 
involving writing individual stock options, even while taking transaction costs into account.  In 
the third chapter of this dissertation, entitled ―Actively Managed Mutual Fund Returns Versus 
the S&P 500 Index,‖ I examine the performance of funds that are ―closet indexers‖.  I develop 
three variables that measure how similar a fund is to the Vanguard 500 Index, and I regress fund 
returns on these measures, along with control variables.  My main result, based on characteristic 
benchmarked returns, is robust to how the standard errors are calculated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 This dissertation includes three studies in empirical finance, covering subjects in 
corporate finance, investments and mutual funds.  In the first chapter, entitled ―Signaling and 
Value Creation in Mergers,‖ I analyze the acquirers in both withdrawn and completed merger 
deals to disentangle the effects of signaling from those of target valuation and expected 
synergies.  Completed stock (cash) acquirers earn 14 percent (10 percent) more than their 
withdrawn counterparts over the six months following initial announcement.  However, if an 
announced stock merger later falls through, the acquirer suffers a negative revaluation due to the 
initial signal released, and the negative return is not reversed upon deal withdrawal.  These 
results suggest that the initial negative stock price reaction in stock mergers is due to a signaling 
effect, but that the mergers themselves are positive NPV investments for the acquirers‘ 
shareholders.  Analysis of the acquirers‘ financial positions also supports the signaling 
interpretation.  Within stock deals, acquirers with more cash and less leverage—those that are 
least likely to need equity financing—have the lowest announcement returns. 
In the second chapter of this dissertation, entitled ―Option Market Overreaction to Stock 
Price Changes,‖ my coauthors and I examine the relationship between implied volatility of 
individual options on S&P 100 stocks and the ex-post realized volatility of the stocks following 
sharp movements in the underlying stock prices.  We find that the implied volatility is 
significantly higher than the realized volatility.  Furthermore, we are able to construct profitable 
trading strategies based on this finding.  We believe that we are the first to document a successful 
trading strategy involving writing individual stock options, even while taking transaction costs 
into account. 
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In the third chapter of this dissertation, entitled ―Actively Managed Mutual Fund Returns 
Versus the S&P 500 Index,‖ I examine the performance of funds that are ―closet indexers‖.  I 
develop three variables that measure how similar a fund is to the Vanguard 500 Index, and I 
regress fund returns on these measures, along with control variables.  The majority of my results 
find that active managers add value over the S&P 500 index, but the results can vary depending 
on benchmarking method, variable used to represent closet indexing, and how standard errors are 
calculated.  The variance in results suggests that previous research be read with caution, as 
methods used to calculate standard errors may produce misleading results.  My main result, 
based on characteristic benchmarked returns, is robust to how the standard errors are calculated. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
SIGNALING AND VALUE CREATION IN MERGERS 
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
The stock price effects of mergers are economically important, since merger transactions 
value billions of dollars each year (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005)).  Much research 
attempts to answer the questions: do mergers create value for the parties involved, and through 
what mechanism is value created or destroyed?  The results have been mixed both for studies 
examining returns in a narrow window surrounding initial announcement, and for long-term 
studies examining returns over a horizon of one year or more.  These are still open questions.  
My findings show that completed mergers, even given adverse information effects, are positive 
net present value projects undertaken by managers acting in the interests of their current 
shareholders.  However, if a stock deal falls through, then the investment attempt backfires:  the 
acquiring firm‘s shareholders lose because a negative signal has been conveyed without a 
positive NPV project to offset the negative announcement return.  My findings are consistent 
with the rational signaling model of Myers and Majluf (1984).   
It is known that stock mergers on average have negative announcement returns, but does 
this necessarily mean that these mergers destroy acquirer value?  I use deals that were ultimately 
withdrawn to answer this question.  I find that an announcement of a stock merger causes the 
acquirer‘s share price to fall 3.6 percent, and this revaluation is not reversed if the deal is 
withdrawn.  This leads to the conclusion that the announcement of a stock merger conveys 
unfavorable information about the acquirer‘s underlying value.  If firms are able to pay cash for a 
target, but still choose to swap stock, the signal to the market is even worse.  Acquirers who have 
more cash on their balance sheets but still announce a stock merger have lower returns than those 
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stock acquirers with less cash.  Stock acquirers with high cash balances and low leverage have 
the worst initial announcement returns.  If these initial negative returns were due to the 
anticipated merger, then it is expected that they would be reversed upon deal withdrawal.  In 
fact, the average withdrawn stock acquirer‘s share price continues to fall another 8.3 percent 
during the six months following the announcement period.  Completed stock acquirers have 
similar announcement returns to withdrawn stock acquirers, but outperform them by 14 percent 
over the next six months, indicating that stock mergers create value for acquirers.  This result 
holds for both raw and Fama-French three-factor model excess returns, in a multivariate 
regression setting, and when using a matching estimator approach. 
The announcement of a cash merger does not release a negative signal, and returns 
surrounding the announcement are significantly different from those involving stock mergers.  
Withdrawn cash acquirers have an average announcement return of 0.7 percent (not significantly 
different from zero), and completed cash acquirers‘ announcement returns average 0.5 percent 
(significant at 5 percent).  Yet, with cash deals there is also a pattern of divergence between 
completed and withdrawn acquirers following the initial announcement: completed cash 
acquirers outperform their withdrawn counterparts by 10 percent in the following six months.  I 
conclude that whether paying with stock or cash, completed acquirers tend to outperform 
withdrawn acquirers.  Mergers appear to be good investments. 
This study is related to two areas of financial literature: research on mergers and research 
on information signals from equity offering announcements. Many studies have documented the 
stock price effect of a firm‘s share issuance, generally with the result that an issuance of common 
stock results in a decrease in the firm‘s stock price.  Masulis (1980) reports a two-day excess 
return of –8 percent around the announcement of a leverage-decreasing change in capital 
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structure.  While he attributes this effect to wealth redistribution among security classes, he 
acknowledges that signaling is another possible cause.  Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find a two-
day excess return of –3.56 percent around the announcement of a common stock issue.  They 
find that the type of security issued is the only determinant of announcement day returns, and 
conclude that managers issue common stock when they think the shares are overpriced.  Asquith 
and Mullins (1986) find support for the hypothesis that the issuance of a seasoned equity offering 
conveys a negative signal to investors about the firm‘s underlying value.  They report an average 
two-day excess announcement return of –2.7 percent.  They find that the announcement effect is 
not due to any ensuing change in capital structure, and that larger offerings result in more 
negative signals.  Shangguan and Vasudevan (2008) compare the announcement returns of firms 
who announce a stock issuance and complete it, and firms that announce a stock issuance and 
then cancel it.  They find evidence that both types of firms are overvalued at the time of 
announcement.  Firms that complete the issuance average an excess return of –2.35 percent 
during the ten days surrounding the announcement, and those that cancel the issuance average an 
excess return of –7.32 percent.   
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) study firms that undertake several mergers over their 
sample period.  An analysis of returns for the month preceding the merger announcement leads 
to the conclusion that acquirers gain on average 2.8 percent.  Travlos (1987) was one of the first 
to test whether announcement returns are differential for cash and stock acquisitions.  His results 
show that stock acquirers have significant negative announcement returns, and cash acquirers 
have insignificant positive announcement returns.  He attributes these results to signaling and 
concludes that stock acquirers are losers.  Moeller, et al (2005) study the announcement period 
dollar gains/losses to acquiring firms and produce mixed results.  They find that, on average, the 
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announcement effect to acquirers is a loss of 12 cents per dollar of acquisition value.  However, 
they note that if several large negative outliers are excluded, then shareholder wealth actually 
increases.   
The evidence from studies using horizons greater than one year is also mixed.  
Malmendier and Moretti (2006) analyze the returns of two firms bidding on the same target.  
They show that successful acquirers significantly underperform unsuccessful ones over the five 
years following the merger fight.  This is taken as evidence that acquiring firm managers overbid 
and destroy value for their long-term shareholders.  Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer and Noah (2005) 
develop two new methods in an attempt to measure value improvements to both acquirers and 
targets.  They use these methods to isolate value changes and exclude any revelation about 
underlying acquirer value that may occur from the announcement.  Unlike Malmendier and 
Moretti, Bhagat, et al find that acquirers do not overpay for targets on average, and that value 
improvements to the combined firm are much higher than previously thought.   
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) model how informed managers take advantage of the 
knowledge that their firms are irrationally overvalued, but still act in the interest of their long-
term shareholders.  Savor and Lu (2008) use failed merger attempts to test the Shleifer-Vishny 
model.  They compare returns of completed and withdrawn mergers over one-year, two-year and 
three-year horizons and conclude that stock acquirers are overvalued prior to deal announcement 
and perform poorly over the long-term holding periods.  Despite this poor performance, 
however, the authors claim that stock deals do create value for acquirers.  Acquirers in 
withdrawn stock deals have lower long-run returns than a hypothetical combined firm, while the 
opposite is true for withdrawn cash deals.  Their conclusion is that stock mergers create value 
from the use of overvalued stock as payment, not through synergies.  Unlike Savor and Lu, I 
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address the signaling aspect of merger announcements.  I also provide evidence that stock 
mergers create value, but my conclusion is that this happens in a rational market and is due to 
synergies.  I find that cash deals also create value—completed cash acquirers have significantly 
higher returns than withdrawn cash acquirers—while Savor and Lu find the opposite.  Thus, I 
explore a different facet of merger gains.  It is entirely possible that both synergies and the use of 
overvalued stock as payment contribute to stock mergers‘ value creation.  My methodology also 
differs.  Deals that failed due to another bidder entering the merger fight cannot be considered 
exogenous to acquirer value, as they are by Savor and Lu.  For example, if an acquirer‘s stock 
price drops, a competitor in a better position may see this as an opportunity to step in and buy the 
target.  However, when limiting a sample to only deals that failed due to outside forces such as 
regulatory action, my sample becomes too small to produce meaningful analysis.  For these 
reasons, I employ several different approaches to address the endogeneity issue.  I also use 
different methodology for analyzing withdrawal returns.  Since information leaks out slowly 
over a period of time, I look at the entire six-month period after the initial merger announcement, 
which includes the withdrawal announcement.  This ensures that all information is incorporated.  
Savor and Lu examine a three-day period surrounding withdrawal announcement.  By that time 
the market has already learned that the probability of failure is very high, which makes the 
withdrawal date less meaningful.  I find that the returns around withdrawal are actually negative, 
whereas Savor and Lu report that they are positive.     
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 1.2 develops hypotheses, Section 
1.3 discusses data and methodology, Section 1.4 presents empirical findings, and Section 1.5 
concludes. 
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1.2  THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Relevant to this paper are three theories of value creation in mergers.  Each model is 
based on different assumptions and yields different predictions.  Myers and Majluf (1984) 
assume that both managers and markets are rational; Roll (1986) assumes that the market is 
rational but managers are not; and Shleifer and Vishny (2003) assume that managers are rational 
but the market is not.   Below, I briefly discuss the theories and outline relevant predictions. 
The Myers-Majluf (1984) signaling hypothesis assumes that there are two states of the 
world: good and bad.  The manager of the firm has a positive NPV investment that he can 
undertake, and he has inside information about the true values of both his firm and the 
investment opportunity, i.e., he knows the true state of the world.  In this case, the acquirer is the 
firm with the investment opportunity, and the takeover of the target is the positive (or at least 
nonnegative) NPV project.  The good state of the world is when the firm‘s true value is above 
the market price, and the bad state of the world is when the firm‘s true value is below the market 
price.  The problem is that it is only optimal for the manager, who maximizes current shareholder 
value, to issue stock to proceed with the acquisition in the bad state of the world.  In the good 
state, the stock is intrinsically worth more than the market price, so issuing would then make the 
project too expensive for the current shareholders.  Investors know this, so if they see an issue, 
they will know that the firm‘s value is lower than they previously thought, and the market price 
will drop accordingly.  The hypotheses as applied to completed and withdrawn merger deals are 
as follows. 
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Hypothesis MM1:  In the period following the announcement, completed acquirers should 
outperform withdrawn acquirers.  The completed acquirers undertake a positive NPV project, 
whereas the withdrawn acquirers don‘t.   
 
Hypothesis MM2:  Since stock issuances are negative signals, the announcement returns of stock 
deals should be lower than the announcement returns of cash deals.  This should be true 
regardless of ultimate completion or withdrawal of the merger attempt.  There should not be 
complete reversal of this return if a stock deal is withdrawn. 
 
Hypothesis MM3:  If a firm has financial slack and still chooses to issue equity, the signal should 
be more strongly negative than if the firm had no slack available.  Myers and Majluf show that 
financial slack is valuable because it alleviates the problem of forgoing good projects because of 
the costly signal of equity issuance.  
 
The main ideas of Roll‘s (1986) hubris hypothesis are that managers are subject to the 
winner‘s curse, fail to adjust for it sufficiently, and tend to overbid for targets.  The result is that 
there are no net gains from mergers, but losses are possible.  The hubris hypothesis predictions 
hold if the announcement is unanticipated and if there is no information regarding underlying 
value released from such an announcement.   
 
Hypothesis R1:  Acquirers will have negative announcement period returns which will be 
reversed if the deal falls through, but will decline more if the deal is completed.   
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The main idea of the Shleifer-Vishny (2003) model is that the market is inefficient. 
Managers have superior information to investors, and they act in ways that take advantage of that 
information.  One of these actions is to pursue stock mergers when their stock is overvalued, 
thereby acquiring a relatively undervalued target for less than if they were to pay cash for it.  
This model assumes that no information is released from the announcement of a merger deal 
other than that of anticipated synergies.  This assumption, which is made for simplicity, puts 
testing this hypothesis outside the scope of this paper.  However, this model is not necessarily 
mutually exclusive of the other two presented:  Shleifer and Vishny allow that there may be a 
mix of rational signaling and irrational misvaluation at the same time.  Both the Myers-Majluf 
and Shleifer-Vishny models imply that managers rationally act in the best interests of their 
shareholders, and that mergers are on average positive NPV investments. 
 
1.3  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Merger data are from Thompson Financial‘s SDC Platinum database.  The sample covers 
deals announced between January 1980 and December 2005.  I only include deals involving 
public acquirers and targets, and those that are either completed or withdrawn within six months 
of the initial deal announcement.  I use a sample of six months in order to avoid some of the 
benchmarking problems associated with longer-term studies while still keeping the sample as 
large as possible.  I focus my analysis on two time periods:  the three trading days surrounding 
the initial announcement, which I call the announcement period, and the period beginning two 
trading days following announcement and ending 120 trading days after announcement, which I 
call the withdrawal or completion period for withdrawn and completed deals, respectively.  The 
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time period from one day before the initial announcement to six months after the initial 
announcement is called the deal period.   
I focus on the entire six-month period to ensure incorporation of all information 
regarding the ultimate outcome of the deal.  For the purpose of determining information signals, 
it is often difficult to pin down an accurate withdrawal date, since information is released slowly 
over a period of time.  For example, the proposed Rite Aid-Revco merger in 1995-1996 was in 
limbo for several months, as the Federal Trade Commission was deciding whether the deal 
violated antitrust laws.  The deal was initially announced in November 1995.  In December 1995, 
the FTC began requesting further information from Rite Aid, and the Hart-Scott-Rodino waiting 
period was extended several times during the first quarter of 1996.  On April 17, 1996 the FTC 
filed suit to block the merger, but Rite Aid did not officially withdraw the offer until April 24.  
Thus, the market learned over a period of months that the deal would ultimately fall through, and 
focusing on the official withdrawal date of April 24, 1996 would miss the release of much of that 
information.  By looking at the entire six-month period following the announcement, I do add a 
considerable amount of noise, but am not excluding any important information dates.  I use a 
period of six months for all deals in order to directly compare returns across deals.   
I categorize deals as ―cash‖ if the consideration is made up of more than 50 percent cash, 
as ―stock‖ if the consideration is made up of more than 50 percent common equity, and I discard 
deals that cannot be categorized as either.  I have also performed the analysis with different 
categorizations of ―cash‖ and ―stock‖ with similar results.  I get return data from CRSP covering 
1979 to 2006, and accounting data from Compustat covering 1979 to 2005.  Fama-French factors 
and industry classifications are downloaded from Ken French‘s website1.    
                                                     
1
 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
12 
 
The sample of withdrawn deals contains 368 deals.  The average deal size is $928 million 
and the average calendar time between initial announcement and official withdrawal is 71 days.  
As shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, deals are greater in both number and value in the 1990s than in 
the rest of the sample, which is consistent with previous findings.  Forty-one percent of the 
withdrawn deals are classified as cash and 59 percent are classified as stock.  The classifications 
through time are shown in Figures 1.3 and 1.4.  This split between stock and cash is in line with 
statistics reported by Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) for the period 1973-1998.  Twenty 
percent of the deals in the withdrawn sample are hostile, and in 29 percent of the deals the 
acquirer faces a competing bidder.  These are both a bit higher than reported by Andrade, et al 
(2001) and than in my own sample of completed deals, suggesting that hostile deals and, not 
surprisingly, potential acquirers with competing bidders are more likely to fail.  The yearly 
breakdown is presented in Table 1.1.  Using the Fama-French 48 industry classifications based 
on SIC codes, the largest concentration of deals is in financial firms, with 15 percent.  Twelve 
percent of the deals are in business services, and the rest of the industries each contain less than 
ten percent of the sample.  The top ten industries represented are listed in Panel A of Table 1.2. 
The sample of completed deals has 2325 deals, with an average size of $663 million and 
an average time between announcement and completion of 108 calendar days.  In this sample, 39 
percent of deals are classified as cash, 61 percent are classified as stock, 2 percent are classified 
as hostile and 4 percent have more than one bidder.  The yearly breakdown of the completed 
deals sample is shown in Table 1.3.  Completed deals are concentrated in largely the same 
industries as withdrawn deals.  As shown in Table 1.2, nine of the top ten industries are the same 
for both samples, albeit in a different order. 
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Table 1.4 reports the cumulative returns for the ten trading days prior to the initial 
announcement period.  This table shows that the returns prior to announcement for completed 
and withdrawn deals are not significantly different from each other.  Whether using the entire 
sample (Panel A), or focusing on stock deals (Panel B) or cash deals (Panel C), there is no 
significant difference between completed and withdrawn deals for either acquirers or targets, nor 
for acquirer excess returns.  Thus, my samples of completed and withdrawn deals appear to be 
quite similar ex ante. 
Despite the similarity of the two samples, endogeneity is still an important issue.  When 
looking at post-announcement returns of withdrawn acquirers, it is unclear if the low returns I 
document are due to the merger‘s failure, or if the merger‘s failure is due to the low returns.  To 
address this problem, I first focus on the cash deals separately.  Cash deals are less likely to fail 
due to poor stock performance, since the value of the deal does not change with the value of the 
acquirer‘s stock.  Next, I create a reduced sample which throws out deals that explicitly failed 
due to the acquirer‘s poor operating or stock price performance.  Using ProQuest and Lexis 
Nexis, I looked up news articles and press releases for every withdrawn deal in the sample.  For 
this reduced withdrawn deals sample, I threw out all deals for which the acquirer‘s falling stock 
price or poor performance was mentioned in the article about deal termination.  While this does 
not fix the endogeneity problem, it at least excludes the most obvious offenders.   
Finally, I use the matching estimator approach of Becker and Ichino (2002), which is 
outlined as follows.  First, a probit regression is run on the full sample (both completed and 
withdrawn deals) to determine a propensity score for each acquirer.  The propensity score is the 
ex ante probability that the deal will fail.  I ran several specifications of the probit regression to 
try to maximize the pseudo R-squared while satisfying the balancing property.  The balancing 
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property is the key to this technique: it states that for a given propensity score, assignment to 
treatment is random, with treatment being deal withdrawal.  The balancing property is tested by 
sorting the observations into five bins based on propensity score.  Within each bin, t-tests are run 
to determine if there is a significant difference between average propensity scores and each input 
to the calculation of propensity scores.  If there are no significant differences, then the bin 
remains as is.  If there are differences, the bin is split and the testing is repeated in each new bin.  
This continues until there are no more significant differences between variables in each bin.  This 
means that withdrawal is as close to random as it can be, given observable ex ante inputs to the 
propensity score.  Mergers are withdrawn for many reasons, such as regulatory issues, due 
diligence findings, and negative acquirer or target performance.  Given withdrawal is due to 
some event (including negative shocks to the acquirer), then each matched firm has a similar 
likelihood of experiencing such an event.  In this way, the endogeneity problem is mitigated, 
although it cannot be completely resolved because not every relevant variable is observable.  
Being able to satisfy the balancing property ensures that the probit specification is reasonable 
and will result in matches with very similar characteristics. This ensures that, based on 
observable ex-ante data, the completed and withdrawn acquirers are as similar as possible.   
Once a specification is found that satisfies the balancing property, the resulting 
propensity scores are used to determine the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT).  I 
utilize three matching techniques, all of which produce similar results: nearest neighbor, kernel, 
and stratification.  In the stratification method, the sample is sorted into bins in which the 
average propensity scores and the average determinants of the propensity scores are not 
significantly different for completed (untreated) and withdrawn (treated) deals.  These bins are 
the same as those created for testing the balancing property.  Average returns of the completed 
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acquirers are compared with those of withdrawn acquirers in each bin.  In the nearest neighbor 
method, each withdrawn acquirer is matched with the completed acquirer with the closest 
propensity score.  The difference in returns is calculated, and the ATT is the average of these 
differences.  In the kernel method, each withdrawn acquirer is compared with a weighted average 
of all completed acquirers, with weights inversely proportional to the difference in treated and 
untreated propensity scores.  The final specification and results from the propensity score 
calculations are presented in Table 1.5.  Balancing property tests result in seven bins.  In 
calculating the propensity score, the statistically significant variables are acquirer size, deal 
value, a dummy variable indicating deal hostility, and inclusion in the high tech, 
telecommunications, wholesale/retail or healthcare industries.  From a sample of 2,478 acquirers, 
the mean p-score is 0.1362 and pseudo R-squared is 0.1777.  This pseudo R-squared is in line 
with other studies employing this technique, such as Villalonga (2004), who applies it to 
diversifying mergers. 
 
1.4  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
By comparing the post-announcement returns of withdrawn and completed acquirers, the 
first results test Hypothesis MM1 and support the theory that mergers create value.  The three-
day initial announcement returns of withdrawn and completed acquirers are not significantly 
different, but returns diverge significantly in the six months following the announcement period.  
Completed acquirers outperform withdrawn acquirers over the six months following 
announcement by 12.31 percent raw return (Table 1.6), significant at the 1 percent level.  The 
pattern is the same for both cash and stock deals.  Completed stock deals outperform withdrawn 
stock deals by 14.07 percent, while completed cash deals outperform withdrawn cash deals by 
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9.98 percent (both significant at 1 percent).  It is also worth noting that completed acquirers have 
a significantly positive raw return for the entire deal period.  For the overall sample, the total 
deal period return to completed acquirers is 6.22 percent; for completed stock acquirers the total 
return is 3.36 percent, and for completed cash acquirers the total return is 7.25 percent.  All three 
estimates are significant at the 1 percent level.  This evidence is consistent with the idea that 
mergers are positive NPV projects and supports Hypothesis MM1.   
The same conclusion is drawn when using the Fama-French three-factor model as a 
benchmark. This is important since this part of the analysis examines returns over a six-month 
period, when the expected return is likely not equal to zero.  Completed acquirers outperform 
withdrawn acquirers over the six months following announcement by an 11.14 percent Fama-
French excess return (Table 1.7), significant at the 1 percent level.  Completed stock acquirers 
outperform withdrawn stock acquirers by 13.52 percent, and completed cash acquirers 
outperform withdrawn cash acquirers by 7.82 percent.  Both estimates are significant at the 1 
percent level.  Completed cash acquirers are the best performers, having a total deal period 
excess return of 3.24 percent (significant at 1 percent).  Completed stock acquirers, however, 
have a total deal period excess return of -1.63 percent, significant at 5 percent.  This is consistent 
with previous research that concludes that stock deals are not good for the acquirers.  However, 
when compared with what would have happened if the deal was withdrawn—the excess return is 
-15.47 percent, significant at 1 percent—it becomes clear that the stock merger deals actually 
create value for the acquirer‘s shareholders.   
These results, however, could be subject to an endogeneity bias.  For example, if deals 
are withdrawn because of the acquirer‘s poor performance, then it is natural to find that those 
acquirers underperform.  The fact that the completed cash deals outperform withdrawn cash 
17 
 
deals by 7.82 percent clearly suggests that this bias does not drive my results.  However, the 
return difference in stock deals is larger in magnitude (13.52 percent), which suggests that the 
endogeneity problem does exist.  To mitigate this problem, I analyze the subsample of 
withdrawn deals which excludes deals that failed due to the acquirer‘s poor performance.  As 
shown in Table 1.8, this technique produces results similar to the original results.  
Announcement returns do not differ between completed and withdrawn acquirers, but returns 
diverge over the next six months.  Completed stock acquirers outperform withdrawn stock 
acquirers by 10.21 percent (significant at the 1 percent level) over the deal period.  Completed 
cash acquirers outperform withdrawn cash acquirers by 7.39 percent (significant at 1 percent) 
over the deal period.  
The next step in controlling for an endogeneity bias is to employ the matching estimator 
technique described in the previous section.  These results, reported in Table 1.9, are even more 
pronounced.  Treatment effects on initial announcement returns are not significantly different 
from zero using any matching method, whereas over the following six months, withdrawn deals 
underperform completed deals by considerable margins. Completed acquirers outperform 
withdrawn acquirers over the entire deal period by raw returns of 18 percent using nearest 
neighbor matching, 15.4 percent using kernel matching and 14.9 percent using the stratification 
method, all significant at the 1 percent level.  Panel B shows similar results when using Frama-
French excess returns: the difference between completed and withdrawn acquirers‘ total excess 
returns is 14.2 percent using nearest neighbor matching and 13.2 percent using kernel matching 
or the stratification method, all significant at the 1 percent level.   
Since I have shown that returns vary depending on the consideration offered, I also 
calculate ATT for cash acquirers and stock acquirers separately.  Table 1.10 shows that the raw 
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return difference between completed and withdrawn cash deals is 14.7 percent when matching by 
nearest neighbor, 14.6 percent using kernel matching and 13.3 percent using stratification, all 
significant at 1 percent.  The Fama-French excess return difference between completed and 
withdrawn cash acquirers‘ returns is 10.7 percent (significant at the 10 percent level) using 
nearest neighbor matching, 11.5 percent (significant at 1 percent) using kernel matching, and 
11.3 percent (significant at 1 percent) using stratification.  The clear conclusion is that cash 
mergers are good investments for the acquirers on average.   
Table 1.11 shows that for stock deals, completed acquirers outperform withdrawn 
acquirers by raw returns of 20.5 percent using nearest neighbor matching, 14.3 percent using 
kernel matching and 15 percent using stratification, all significant at 1 percent.  Completed stock 
acquirers also outperform withdrawn stock acquirers when looking at Fama-French excess 
returns.  The differences between completed and withdrawn are 18.3 percent using nearest 
neighbor matching, 14.3 percent using kernel matching and 13.9 percent using stratification, all 
significant at 1 percent.  The return differences reported in Tables 1.9, 1.10 and 1.11 compare 
acquirers with very similar ex ante probabilities of failure, market capitalization, profitability, 
and industry concentrations, and similar deals in terms of consideration, hostility, value and 
target type.  Thus, the results are not driven by any of these ex ante differences in acquirers, nor 
by a deal‘s ex ante propensity to fail based on these observable characteristics.   
My next task is to investigate whether there is evidence of an information signal in 
merger announcement returns.  Stock deals have significantly negative announcement returns, 
regardless of deal completion or withdrawal.  Table 1.6 shows that the announcement return for 
stock acquirers is –3.57 percent if the deal is withdrawn and –2.2 percent if the deal is 
completed, both significant at the 1 percent level.  These results are consistent with previous 
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findings (Andrade, et al (2001)).  As predicted by Hypothesis MM2, acquirers‘ initial 
announcement returns show a significant differential between cash and stock deals.  As shown in 
Panel D of Table 1.6, withdrawn cash deals‘ returns exceed those of stock deals by 4.1 percent 
over the three days surrounding the initial announcement date, significant at the 1 percent level.  
Completed cash acquirers‘ returns exceed completed stock acquirers‘ by 2.72 percent, also 
significant at 1 percent.  These results are consistent with Travlos 1987, but are not enough to 
prove that signaling is the cause of the return differential.  I perform robustness checks and test 
Hypothesis MM3 to add support to the argument that signaling is a factor in stock mergers. 
My first robustness check performs the same univariate analysis with returns 
benchmarked on the Fama-French three-factor model.  Table 1.7 reports the results using Fama-
French excess returns.  The announcement returns to stock acquirers remain significantly 
negative: –3.06 percent for withdrawn acquirers and –2.24 percent for completed acquirers.  The 
difference between cash and stock acquirers is similar in magnitude and highly significant when 
using excess returns based on the Fama-French three-factor model.  Excess returns to withdrawn 
cash acquirers exceed withdrawn stock acquirers by 3.56 percent, significant at the 1 percent 
level.  In completed deals, excess returns of cash acquirers are 2.53 percent higher than those of 
stock acquirers, also significant at 1 percent. 
The conclusion that stock acquirers have lower announcement returns than cash acquirers 
still holds under a multivariate analysis.  Table 1.12 reports results of OLS regressions, where the 
dependent variable is the announcement period return.  The variable of interest is the stock 
dummy, which equals one if the deal was classified as stock, and zero otherwise.  The coefficient 
on this variable shows that stock acquirers‘ announcement returns are 3.87 percent lower than 
cash acquirers for withdrawn deals, when controlling only for acquirers‘ cash holdings.  When 
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controlling for acquirers‘ cash holdings, market equity, leverage and investment opportunities as 
well as the ratio of acquirer size to target size, the return difference between withdrawn stock and 
withdrawn cash acquirers is –3.68 percent.  Both results are significant at the 1 percent level.  
For completed deals, the stock minus cash differential is –2.69 percent when controlling only for 
acquirers‘ cash holdings, and –2.84 percent with additional controls (both significant at 1 
percent).  Whether performing a univariate analysis on raw or excess returns or in a regression 
framework, I find strong support for Hypothesis MM2.   
According to Myers-Majluf, firms that have financial slack available but still choose to 
issue equity send an especially strong negative signal to the market.  This is the idea behind 
Hypothesis MM3.  To test the importance of financial slack in merger announcement returns, I 
form two subsamples—withdrawn stock deals and completed stock deals.  I sort each subsample 
into quartiles according to the ratio of cash to assets and compare initial announcement returns.  
The results are reported in Table 1.13.  For both the completed and withdrawn samples, the 
initial announcement return generally decreases as the cash ratio increases.  In the completed 
sample, the difference between the quartiles with the most cash and the least cash is –3.16 
percent, significant at the 1 percent level.  The difference in the withdrawn sample is –2.46 
percent; it is not statistically significant, but this is probably a lack of power due to the small 
sample size.   
Since leverage is also an important factor in a firm‘s issuance decision, I look at how 
cash and leverage together affect initial announcement returns.  I sort the stock deal samples 
independently into high and low cash bins and high and low leverage bins, using 50 percent as 
the cutoff in order to keep the bins as large as possible.  Table 1.14 shows that for both 
withdrawn and completed stock deals, the firms with both high cash balances and low leverage 
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have the worst announcement returns.  Such withdrawn acquirers‘ returns are –5.27 percent 
(significant at 1 percent), compared to the next closest group‘s return of –1.93 percent.  Such 
completed acquirers‘ returns are –3.74 percent (significant at the 1 percent level), with the next 
closest group having a return of –1.51 percent.  For the completed deals, the returns to stock 
acquirers with the most cash and the least leverage are significantly lower than each of the other 
three group classifications at the 1 percent level. 
As an additional test, I run cross-sectional regressions using the samples of withdrawn 
deals and completed deals separately.  The dependent variable is the initial three-day 
announcement return, and the independent variable of interest is the cash ratio, which is defined 
as cash and marketable securities divided by book value of assets.  Table 1.15 reports the results 
from these regressions.  I run the regressions using two subsamples based upon deal 
consideration.  I find that for cash deals, the cash ratio coefficient is insignificantly different 
from zero for both withdrawn and completed acquirers.  Using the sample of completed stock 
deals, the cash ratio coefficient is –0.0852 without other control variables, and –0.0925 when 
control variables such as deal size and acquirer size, leverage and Q are included.  Both 
coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level.  For withdrawn stock deals, the cash ratio 
coefficient is –0.1025 (significant at the 1 percent level) and –0.836 (significant at the 10 percent 
level) when other control variables are included.  In all regressions for stock deals, the 
coefficients for leverage are positive but insignificant.  These findings support Hypothesis MM3: 
firms that announce a stock merger when they have more of an ability to pay cash convey an 
especially negative signal to the market about their true underlying value.   
Finally, to test the predictions of the hubris hypothesis, I focus on cash deals because they 
are less likely to carry a signal of underlying acquirer value.  The initial announcement returns 
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for withdrawn cash deals are nonnegative and are close to zero during the withdrawal period, as 
shown in Table 1.6, Panel C.  Completed cash deals have significantly positive (at the 5 percent 
level) announcement period returns, followed by significantly positive (at the 1 percent level) 
returns during the completion period.  Using excess returns (Table 1.7, Panel C) shows that the 
initial announcement return for withdrawn cash acquirers is nonnegative, and the withdrawal 
period return is –4.79, significant at the 5 percent level.  These results are contrary to the hubris 
hypothesis and inconsistent with Hypothesis R1, which predicts negative announcement returns 
which reverse if the deal fails, and decline more if the deal is completed.  The hubris hypothesis 
does not appear to hold in my sample of withdrawn merger deals.   
  
1.5  CONCLUSION 
My findings are consistent with the idea that mergers, on average, create value for 
acquirers.  Using a comparison between completed and withdrawn deals, I show that although 
completed and withdrawn deals have similar initial acquirer announcement returns, they diverge 
significantly after the three-day announcement period. Completed stock acquirers outperform 
withdrawn stock acquirers by 14 percent over the six months following the initial announcement, 
and completed cash acquirers outperform withdrawn cash acquirers by nearly 10 percent.  My 
findings support the idea that a stock merger announcement conveys a negative signal to the 
market regarding the acquirer‘s underlying value.  Initial announcement period returns for stock 
acquirers are significantly negative and significantly less than cash acquirers‘ returns.  
Withdrawn stock acquirers average a –3.6 percent announcement return and completed stock 
acquirers average a –2.2 percent announcement return, and these returns are not significantly 
different from each other.  The negative initial announcement returns are not reversed when a 
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merger deal falls through.  In addition, stock acquirers with more financial slack have lower 
announcement returns than those with less financial slack, and this holds for both withdrawn and 
completed deals.  My results support the Myers-Majluf (1984) signaling hypothesis, reject the 
Roll (1986) hubris hypothesis, and do not support (but leave room for) theories based on market 
inefficiency. 
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1.7  TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1.1: Withdrawn Deals' Makeup by Year  
This table breaks down the deal makeup of the withdrawn merger sample 
by announcement year.  Cash indicates that the consideration is more 
than 50% cash.  Stock indicates that the consideration is more than 50% 
stock.  Challenged indicates that there is more than one concurrent bid for 
the target.  Hostile indicates that the deal is marked in SDC as either 
"hostile" or "unsolicited". 
Year Cash Stock Challenged Hostile N 
1980 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1 
1981 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 1 
1982 na na na na 0 
1983 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 
1984 66.67% 33.33% 0.00% 0.00% 3 
1985 62.50% 37.50% 31.25% 37.50% 16 
1986 57.14% 42.86% 64.29% 35.71% 14 
1987 56.00% 44.00% 44.00% 52.00% 25 
1988 70.83% 29.17% 45.83% 54.17% 24 
1989 41.18% 58.82% 17.65% 52.94% 17 
1990 20.00% 80.00% 20.00% 10.00% 10 
1991 15.38% 84.62% 7.69% 15.38% 13 
1992 15.38% 84.62% 7.69% 23.08% 13 
1993 35.71% 64.29% 28.57% 35.72% 14 
1994 39.29% 60.71% 32.14% 21.43% 28 
1995 31.82% 68.18% 18.18% 27.27% 22 
1996 30.00% 70.00% 25.00% 40.00% 20 
1997 47.37% 52.63% 31.58% 36.84% 19 
1998 37.93% 62.07% 31.03% 20.69% 29 
1999 41.94% 58.06% 29.03% 38.71% 31 
2000 37.50% 62.50% 21.88% 25.01% 32 
2001 25.00% 75.00% 31.25% 18.75% 16 
2002 33.33% 66.67% 16.67% 50.00% 6 
2003 20.00% 80.00% 20.00% 40.00% 5 
2004 40.00% 60.00% 40.00% 0.00% 5 
2005 66.67% 33.33% 100.00% 66.67% 3 
Total 41.03% 58.97% 29.35% 32.89% 368 
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Table 1.2: Top Ten Industries    
Industries are classified according to the 48 Fama-French industries.  
The ten industries with the highest number of deals are reported for 
both the sample of withdrawn deals and the sample of completed 
deals. 
Panel A: Withdrawn Deals   
Rank Industry Number of Deals Percentage of Deals 
1 Financial  55 14.95% 
2 Business Services 43 11.68% 
3 Healthcare 24 6.52% 
4 Retail  22 5.98% 
5 Communications 19 5.16% 
6 Electronic Equipment 16 4.35% 
7 Banking 14 3.80% 
8 Petroleum & Natural Gas 13 3.53% 
9 Machinery 13 3.53% 
10 Pharmaceuticals 12 3.26% 
Panel B: Completed Deals   
Rank Industry Number of Deals Percentage of Deals 
1 Financial 375 16.23% 
2 Banking 328 14.19% 
3 Business Services 319 13.80% 
4 Electronic Equipment 115 4.98% 
5 Computers 86 3.72% 
6 Pharmaceuticals 84 3.63% 
7 Communications 67 2.90% 
8 Retail 63 2.73% 
9 Healthcare 61 2.64% 
10 Petroleum & Natural Gas 56 2.42% 
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Table 1.3:  Completed Deals' Makeup By Year 
This table breaks down the deal makeup of the completed merger sample by 
announcement year.  Cash indicates that the consideration is more than 50% cash.  
Stock indicates that the consideration is more than 50% stock.  Challenged indicates 
that there is more than one concurrent bid for the target.  Hostile indicates that the 
deal is marked in SDC as either "hostile" or "unsolicited". 
Year Cash Stock Challenged Hostile N 
1980 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1 
1981 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2 
1982 na na na na 0 
1983 na na na na 0 
1984 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 10.00% 10 
1985 67.19% 32.81% 7.81% 7.81% 64 
1986 72.46% 27.54% 11.59% 7.25% 69 
1987 51.52% 48.48% 12.12% 6.06% 66 
1988 76.36% 23.64% 25.45% 7.27% 55 
1989 50.00% 50.00% 15.91% 0.00% 44 
1990 52.38% 47.62% 4.76% 0.00% 21 
1991 32.43% 67.57% 2.70% 0.00% 37 
1992 24.39% 75.61% 0.00% 0.00% 41 
1993 38.18% 61.82% 1.82% 0.00% 55 
1994 31.31% 68.69% 4.04% 3.03% 99 
1995 32.43% 67.57% 3.38% 4.05% 148 
1996 30.81% 69.19% 2.91% 1.74% 172 
1997 30.23% 69.77% 3.49% 1.16% 258 
1998 26.52% 73.48% 2.17% 0.43% 230 
1999 35.22% 64.78% 0.87% 0.87% 230 
2000 33.33% 66.67% 2.08% 0.52% 192 
2001 38.56% 61.44% 2.61% 0.65% 153 
2002 48.57% 51.43% 3.81% 0.95% 105 
2003 50.00% 50.00% 2.73% 1.82% 110 
2004 48.65% 51.35% 2.70% 0.00% 111 
2005 55.77% 44.23% 3.85% 0.00% 52 
Total 39.44% 60.56% 4.09% 1.81% 2325 
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Table 1.4:  Cumulative Returns Days –11 to –2 Before Announcement  
This table shows acquirer and target raw returns, and acquirer excess returns during the 
two weeks immediately before the initial announcement period. Returns are cumulative. 
Deals are classified as "cash" ("stock") if the consideration offered is more than 50% 
cash (stock). Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Panel A: All Deals       
 (A) (B) (C) 
 Withdrawn Completed Difference (A-B) 
  N=368 N=2288  
Acquirer return 0.0148 0.0152 -0.0004 
 (2.77)*** (7.86)*** (0.08) 
    
Acquirer FF excess return 0.0067 0.0070 -0.0003 
 (1.46) (4.31)*** (0.07) 
    
Target return 0.0635 0.0635 0.0000 
 (6.66)*** (17.00)*** (0.00) 
     
Panel B: Stock Deals    
 (A) (B) (C) 
 Withdrawn Completed Difference (A-B) 
  N=218 N=1384  
Acquirer return 0.0214 0.0176 0.0038 
 (2.80)*** (6.50)*** (0.47) 
    
Acquirer FF excess return 0.0138 0.0077 0.0061 
 (2.11)** (3.46)*** (0.89) 
    
Target return 0.0523 0.0606 -0.0083 
 (4.45)*** (13.48)*** (0.66) 
     
Panel C: Cash Deals    
 (A) (B) (C) 
 Withdrawn Completed Difference (A-B) 
  N=150 N=904  
Acquirer return 0.0052 0.0116 -0.0064 
 (0.75) (4.44)*** (0.86) 
    
Acquirer FF excess return -0.0038 0.0059 -0.0097 
 (0.65) (2.58)** (1.57) 
    
Target return 0.0798 0.0677 0.0120 
 (5.00)*** (10.53)*** (0.70) 
     
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.5: Probit Regressions to Determine Propensity Score     
This table reports the results from three separate probit regressions to determine propensity scores.  The 
dependent variable is 0 if the deal was completed, and 1 if the deal was withdrawn.  The regression on 
the full sample includes a dummy variable that equals 0 if it is a cash deal and 1 if it is a stock deal. 
  Full Sample Cash Sample Stock Sample 
  Coefficient Z-stat   Coefficient Z-stat   Coefficient Z-stat 
Intercept 0.6858 (1.70)*  0.6165 (0.96)  0.8991 (1.70)* 
Profit margin -0.0452 (1.51)  -0.0786 (0.81)  -0.0440 (1.33) 
ROA 0.4370 (1.58)  0.1846 (0.37)  0.5687 (1.72)* 
Acquirer size -0.4823 (4.47)***  -0.4164 (2.39)**  -0.5445 (3.84)*** 
Acquirer size squared 0.0142 (1.86)*  0.0115 (0.92)  0.0160 (1.61) 
Deal value 0.1368 (4.51)***  0.0932 (1.96)**  0.1795 (4.33)*** 
Hostile dummy 1.4307 (10.02)***  1.4655 (8.83)***  1.7527 (5.26)*** 
Horizontal merger dummy 0.0801 (0.90)  -0.0214 (0.14)  0.1219 (1.11) 
Consideration dummy 0.1083 (1.39)         
Industry cash/assets -2.3300 (1.42)  -1.1201 (0.45)  -3.1285 (1.43) 
HHI -1.4305 (0.80)  -3.8422 (1.47)  1.3114 (0.50) 
Consumer nondurables -0.1372 (0.62)  -0.0746 (0.26)  -0.2664 (0.70) 
Consumer durables 0.3667 (0.92)  0.7403 (1.48)  -0.3626 (0.50) 
Manufacturing 0.0743 (0.50)  -0.0100 (0.05)  0.1567 (0.72) 
Energy 0.1623 (0.62)  0.3040 (0.65)  -0.0907 (0.27) 
Technology 0.3628 (2.02)**  0.3432 (1.20)  0.3103 (1.29) 
Telecom 0.6956 (3.11)***  1.2909 (3.65)***  0.1896 (0.62) 
Shops 0.2814 (2.00)**  0.0715 (0.32)  0.4041 (2.20)** 
Health 0.4244 (2.66)***  -0.0245 (0.08)  0.4855 (2.40)** 
Utilities 0.3867 (1.32)  0.0100 (0.02)  0.5759 (1.53) 
           
Pseudo R-squared 0.1777   0.2423  0.1536 
N 2478   988  1490 
Mean pscore 0.1362   0.1436   0.1320 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.6:  Returns Over 6-Month Window 
This table reports the average cumulative equal-weighted returns to acquirers over a three-day period 
surrounding the initial announcement of the deal and over the following six months. Also reported is the 
average total cumulative return beginning one trading day before and ending 120 trading days after 
initial deal announcement. Deals are classified as "cash" ("stock") if the consideration offered is more 
than 50% cash (stock). Panel (D) reports the average acquirer returns of cash deals minus the average 
acquirer returns of stock deals. Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  
Panel A: All Deals       
  (A) (B) (C) 
 Withdrawn (N=368) Completed (N=2322) Difference (A-B) 
Days -1 to +1 -0.0184 -0.0112 -0.0071 
 (3.44)*** (7.31)*** (1.28) 
    
Days +2 to +120 -0.0483 0.0749 -0.1231 
 (2.48)** (10.10)*** (5.92)*** 
    
Days -1 to +120 -0.0652 0.0622 -0.1274 
 (3.33)*** (8.48)*** (6.10)*** 
     Panel B: Stock Deals    
  (A) (B) (C) 
 Withdrawn (N=217) Completed (N=1406) Difference (A-B) 
Days -1 to +1 -0.0357 -0.0220 -0.0138 
 (4.71)*** (10.74)*** (1.75)* 
    
Days +2 to +120 -0.0834 0.0573 -0.1407 
 (2.98)*** (5.65)*** (4.73)*** 
    
Days -1 to +120 -0.1161 0.0336 -0.1497 
 (4.21)*** (3.40)*** (5.11)*** 
     Panel C: Cash Deals    
 (A) (B) (C) 
 Withdrawn (N=151) Completed (N=916) Difference (A-B) 
Days -1 to +1 0.0066 0.0052 0.0014 
 (1.00) (2.36)** (0.20) 
    
Days +2 to +120 0.0022 0.1020 -0.0998 
 (0.09) (9.74)*** (3.74)*** 
    
Days -1 to +120 0.0080 0.1061 -0.0981 
 (0.32) (9.96)*** (3.57)*** 
        
Panel D: Difference in Returns Between Cash and Stock Deals 
 (A) (B)  
 Withdrawn Completed  
Days -1 to +1 0.0410 0.0272  
 (4.10)*** (9.03)***  
    
Days +2 to +120 0.0755 0.0447  
 (2.03)** (3.07)***  
    
Days -1 to +120 0.1116 0.0725  
 (2.95)*** (5.00)***  
    
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.7:  Fama-French 3-Factor Excess Returns Over 6-Month Window 
This table reports the average cumulative equal-weighted excess returns to acquirers over a three-day period 
surrounding the initial announcement of the deal and over the following six months. Also reported is the average 
total cumulative excess return beginning one trading day before and ending 120 trading days after initial deal 
announcement.  Excess returns are calculated using the Fama-French three-factor model. Deals are classified 
as "cash" ("stock") if the consideration offered is more than 50% cash (stock). Panel (D) reports the average 
acquirer returns of cash deals minus the average acquirer returns of stock deals. Absolute values of t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. 
Panel A: All Deals    
  (A) (B) (C) 
 Withdrawn (N=355) Completed (N=2207) Difference (A-B) 
Days -1 to +1 -0.0155 -0.0123 -0.0032 
 (3.17)*** (8.47)*** (0.62) 
    
Days +2 to +120 -0.0949 0.0165 -0.1114 
 (5.29)*** (2.56)** (5.85)*** 
    
Days -1 to +120 -0.1081 0.0030561 -0.1112 
 (5.93)*** (0.48) (5.76)*** 
     Panel B: Stock Deals    
  (A) (B) (C) 
 Withdrawn (N=209) Completed (N=1330) Difference (A-B) 
Days -1 to +1 -0.0306 -0.0224 -0.0082 
 (4.48)*** (11.42)*** (1.15) 
    
Days +2 to +120 -0.1278 0.0074 -0.1352 
 (5.02)*** (0.87) (5.03)*** 
    
Days -1 to +120 -0.1547 -0.0163 -0.1384 
 (6.14)*** (1.96)** (5.21)*** 
     Panel C: Cash Deals    
 (A) (B) (C) 
 Withdrawn (N=146) Completed (N=877) Difference (A-B) 
Days -1 to +1 0.0061 0.0029 0.0032 
 (0.95) (1.44) (0.47) 
    
Days +2 to +120 -0.0479 0.0303 -0.0782 
 (2.04)** (3.09)*** (3.07)*** 
    
Days -1 to +120 -0.0415 0.0324 -0.0739 
 (1.67)* (3.27)*** (2.77)*** 
     Panel D: Difference in Returns Between Cash and Stock Deals 
 (A) (B)  
 Withdrawn Completed  
Days -1 to +1 0.0356 0.0253  
 (3.81)*** (8.97)***  
    Days +2 to +120 0.0740 0.0229  
 (2.16)** (1.73)*  
    Days -1 to +120 0.1055 0.0487  
 (2.99)*** (3.74)***  
    
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.8:  Fama-French 3-Factor Excess Returns Over 6-Month Window (Reduced Sample) 
This table reports the average cumulative equal-weighted excess returns to acquirers over a three-
day period surrounding the initial announcement of the deal and over the following six months.  
Also reported is the average total cumulative return beginning one trading before and ending 120 
trading days after initial deal announcement.  This sample excludes deals cited in the press as 
failing due to poor acquirer performance.  Deals are classified as "cash" ("stock") if the 
consideration offered is more than 50% cash (stock). Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. 
Panel A: All Deals    
  (A) (B) (C) 
 Withdrawn Completed Difference (A-B) 
  N=329 N=2207  
Days -1 to +1 -0.0140 -0.0123 -0.0016 
 (2.82)*** (8.47)*** (0.32) 
    
Days +2 to +120 -0.0725 0.0165 -0.0890 
 (3.99)*** (2.56)** (4.61)*** 
    
Days -1 to +120 -0.0854 0.0030561 -0.0885 
 (4.61)*** (0.48) (4.52)*** 
     
Panel B: Stock Deals    
  (A) (B) (C) 
 Withdrawn Completed Difference (A-B) 
  N=186 N=1330  
Days -1 to +1 -0.0302 -0.0224 -0.0078 
 (4.31)*** (11.42)*** (1.07) 
    
Days +2 to +120 -0.0947 0.0074 -0.1021 
 (3.58)*** (0.87) (3.67)*** 
    
Days -1 to +120 -0.1233 -0.0163 -0.1070 
 (4.70)*** (1.96)* (3.89)*** 
     
Panel C: Cash Deals    
 (A) (B) (C) 
 Withdrawn Completed Difference (A-B) 
  N=143 N=877  
Days -1 to +1 0.0071 0.0029 0.0041 
 (1.09) (1.44) (0.61) 
    
Days +2 to +120 -0.0437 0.0303 -0.0739 
 (1.84)* (3.09)*** (-2.88)*** 
    
Days -1 to +120 -0.0362 0.0324 -0.0686 
 (1.44) (3.27)*** (2.55)*** 
     
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.9:  Average Treatment Effects on Withdrawn Deals   
This table reports the average treatment effect on the treated over a three-day 
period surrounding the initial announcement of the deal and over the following six 
months.  Also reported is the ATT beginning one trading day before and ending 
120 trading days after initial deal announcement.  In this case, the treatment group 
is the sample of withdrawn mergers.  Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. 
Panel A: Raw Returns       
  (A) (B) (C) 
 Nearest Kernel Stratification 
  Neighbor     
Days -1 to +1 -0.0120 -0.0060 -0.0050 
 (1.08) (0.75) (0.83) 
    
Days +2 to +120 -0.1730 -0.1490 -0.1450 
 (4.75)*** (5.96)*** (5.51)*** 
    
Days -1 to +120 -0.1800 -0.1540 -0.1490 
 (3.85)*** (5.74)*** (5.09)*** 
    
Panel B: Fama-French Excess Returns     
  (A) (B) (D) 
 Nearest Kernel Stratification 
  Neighbor     
Days -1 to +1 -0.0090 -0.0050 -0.0050 
 (0.87) (0.79) (0.78) 
    
Days +2 to +120 -0.1370 -0.1300 -0.1300 
 (3.53)*** (4.65)*** (6.18)*** 
    
Days -1 to +120 -0.1420 -0.1320 -0.1320 
 (3.66)*** (4.86)*** (5.57)*** 
        
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.10:  Average Treatment Effects on Withdrawn Cash Deals 
This table reports the average treatment effect on the treated over a three-day 
period surrounding the initial announcement of the deal and over the following six 
months.  Also reported is the ATT beginning one trading day before and ending 
120 trading days after initial deal announcement.  The analysis is done using only 
cash deals.  In this case, the treatment group is the sample of withdrawn cash 
mergers.  Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Panel A: Raw Returns       
  (A) (B) (C) 
 Nearest Kernel Stratification 
  Neighbor     
Days -1 to +1 0.0010 0.0010 0.003 
 (0.05) (0.093) (0.27) 
    
Days +2 to +120 -0.1460 -0.1460 -0.135 
 (3.01)*** (3.30)*** (3.24)*** 
    
Days -1 to +120 -0.1470 -0.1460 -0.133 
 (2.61)*** (3.22)*** (3.22)*** 
    
Panel B: Fama-French Excess Returns     
  (A) (B) (D) 
 Nearest Kernel Stratification 
  Neighbor     
Days -1 to +1 0.0040 0.0010 0.003 
 (0.29) (0.15) (0.32) 
    
Days +2 to +120 -0.1080 -0.1160 -0.114 
 (2.78)*** (3.01)*** (3.73)*** 
    
Days -1 to +120 -0.1070 -0.1150 -0.113 
 (1.81)* (2.99)*** (2.60)*** 
        
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.11:  Average Treatment Effects on Withdrawn Stock Deals 
This table reports the average treatment effect on the treated over a three-day 
period surrounding the initial announcement of the deal and over the following six 
months.  Also reported is the ATT beginning one trading day before and ending 
120 trading days after initial deal announcement.  The analysis is done using only 
stock deals.  In this case, the treatment group is the sample of withdrawn stock 
mergers.  Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Panel A: Raw Returns       
  (A) (B) (C) 
 Nearest Kernel Stratification 
  Neighbor     
Days -1 to +1 -0.0050 -0.0090 -0.009 
 (0.46) (1.13) (1.23) 
    
Days +2 to +120 -0.2120 -0.1370 -0.144 
 (4.42)*** (3.99)*** (3.93)*** 
    
Days -1 to +120 -0.2050 -0.1430 -0.15 
 (4.32)*** (4.37)*** (4.66)*** 
    
Panel B: Fama-French Excess Returns     
  (A) (B) (D) 
 Nearest Kernel Stratification 
  Neighbor     
Days -1 to +1 -0.0030 -0.0080 -0.009 
 (0.24) (1.11) (1.01) 
    
Days +2 to +120 -0.1930 -0.1400 -0.137 
 (2.98)*** (4.55)*** (4.83)*** 
    
Days -1 to +120 -0.1830 -0.1430 -0.139 
 (4.42)*** (4.65)*** (4.84)*** 
        
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.12: Cross-sectional Regressions   
The dependent variable is the 3-day announcement period return.  Stock dummy 
equals one if the deal is classified as stock and zero otherwise.  Cash ratio is 
acquirer cash and marketable securities divided by assets.  Size ratio is target 
market equity divided by acquirer market equity.  Acquirer size is the log of 
acquirer market equity.  Q is acquirer market value of equity plus book value of 
debt divided by book value of assets.  Leverage is acquirer debt divided by assets.  
Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
  Withdrawn Deals Completed Deals 
  N=338 N=1573 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Intercept 0.0155 0.0641 0.0128 0.0245 
 (1.75)* (2.58)*** (4.09)*** (2.30)** 
      
Stock Dummy -0.0387 -0.0368 -0.0269 -0.0284 
 (3.69)*** (3.48)*** (7.18)*** (7.46)*** 
      
Cash Ratio -0.0504 -0.0517 -0.0675 -0.0738 
 (1.96)* (1.66)* (6.80)*** (6.06)*** 
      
Size Ratio  0.0005   -0.0022 
  (0.28)   (0.44) 
      
Acquirer Size  -0.0089   -0.0020 
  (3.04)***   (1.87)* 
      
Q  -0.0006   0.0008 
  (0.44)   (2.66)*** 
      
Leverage  0.0101   0.0051 
  (0.43)   (0.61) 
          
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.13: Stock Acquirers’ 3-Day Announcement Period Return by 
Cash Quartiles 
Withdrawn and completed stock deals are sorted independently into 
quartiles based on the acquirer’s ratio of cash to assets.  Reported is the 
average acquirer announcement return for each quartile.  Absolute values 
of t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
  Withdrawn Completed 
  N=200 N=1343 
Least Cash -0.0336 -0.0122 
 (2.25)** (3.61)*** 
   
Quartile 2 -0.0109 -0.0136 
 (0.85) (4.58)*** 
   
Quartile 3 -0.0222 -0.0177 
 (1.79)* (4.95)*** 
   
Most Cash -0.0582 -0.0438 
 (3.04)*** (7.52)*** 
   
Most - Least -0.0246 -0.0316 
  (1.01) (4.69)*** 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 1.14: Stock Acquirers’ 3-Day Initial Announcement Period Return by Cash 
and Leverage Levels 
Stock deals are sorted independently into top 50% and bottom 50% by acquirer debt to 
assets and cash to assets.  Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Panel A:  Withdrawn Deals   
 High Cash Low Cash 
High Leverage -0.0080 -0.0234 
 (0.50) (2.09)** 
   
Low Leverage -0.0527 -0.0193 
 (3.63)*** (0.95) 
   
Panel B:  Completed Deals  
 High Cash Low Cash 
High Leverage -0.0151 -0.0148 
 (3.57)*** (6.57)*** 
   
Low Leverage -0.0374 -0.0088 
 (8.23)*** (1.66)* 
   
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.15: Cross-sectional Regressions   
The dependent variable is the acquirer’s 3-day announcement period return.  Cash ratio is acquirer cash 
and marketable securities divided by assets.  Size ratio is target market equity divided by acquirer market 
equity.  Acquirer size is the log of acquirer market equity.  Q is acquirer market value of equity plus book 
value of debt divided by book value of assets.  Leverage is acquirer debt divided by assets.  Absolute 
values of t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 Withdrawn Deals   Completed Deals 
  Cash Deals Stock Deals Cash Deals Stock Deals 
  N=142 N=196 N=636 N=937 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
            
Intercept 0.0008 0.1149 -0.0128 0.0006 0.0068 0.0367 -0.0112 0.0085 
 (0.09) (3.88)*** (1.26) (0.02) (1.97)** (2.55)** (3.48)*** (0.55) 
             
Cash Ratio 0.0466 -0.0135 -0.1025 -0.0836 -0.0187 -0.0259 -0.0852 -0.0925 
 (1.28) (0.33) (2.95)*** (1.91)* (1.06) (1.32) (7.02)*** (5.95)*** 
             
Size Ratio   0.0007   -0.0216   0.0047   -0.0354 
   (0.43)   (2.12)**   (0.92)   (3.34)*** 
             
Acquirer Size   -0.0171   -0.0028   -0.0032   -0.0025 
   (4.72)***   (0.66)   (2.09)**   (1.60) 
             
Q   0.0008   -0.0007   -0.0004   0.0009 
   (0.23)   (0.42)   (0.26)   (2.86)*** 
             
Leverage   -0.0080   0.0251   -0.0097   0.0080 
   (0.26)   (0.76)   (0.74)   (0.74) 
                  
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Figure 1.1 
This figure shows the number of merger deals announced each year, including the proportions 
of deals that were ultimately completed and deals that were ultimately withdrawn. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 
This figure shows the total value in millions of dollars of merger deals announced each year, 
including the proportions of deals that were ultimately completed and deals that were ultimately 
withdrawn.
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Figure 1.3 
This figure shows the total number of ultimately withdrawn deals announced each year, broken 
down by consideration. 
 
 
Figure 1.4 
This figure shows the average value (in millions of dollars) of ultimately withdrawn cash deals 
and ultimately withdrawn stock deals announced each year.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
OPTION MARKET OVERREACTION TO STOCK PRICE CHANGES 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
―Rumors that eBay, Inc. could face new competition from Google, Inc. sent investors scurrying 
to the options market…. Not the kind to wait for confirmation…investors had already focused in 
on eBay‘s short-term puts as they weighed what the news could do to the Internet auctioneer‘s 
stock.  More than twice as many puts traded Tuesday than on an average day in the preceding 
three weeks.‖ – Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2005 
 
―Even before trading costs are imposed, systematically writing stock options does not appear to 
generate abnormal gains.‖ – Bollen and Whaley 2004 
 
There is evidence in the literature that investors misreact in the option market.  Stein 
(1989) first documented this misreaction, and more recently, Poteshman (2001) showed that 
option investors overreact in the long term and underreact in the short term.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that investors turn to the option market to act rapidly on pressing information.  If that is 
indeed the case, it seems that there should be a systematic way to generate profits in the option 
market based on investor behavior.  Bollen and Whaley (2004) found that writing options on 
individual stocks does not systematically produce profits (even before trading costs).  Our results 
stand in contrast to theirs in that we are able to find significant trading profits in writing options.  
The reason for the difference in results is how we partition the individual stocks.  
Unconditionally writing puts and calls on stocks, we find results similar to theirs (although on a 
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larger scale – we examine all the individual stocks in the S&P 100 while they look at the 20 
stocks with the most actively traded options).  When conditioning on recent stock price 
performance, however, we find that after large stock price drops, the strategy of writing put 
options systematically provides profits for the investor.  Following sharp stock price declines (of 
at least 10 percent), there is a statistically significant difference between the implied volatility of 
options (in particular, out-of-the-money puts) on that stock and the ex-post realized volatility of 
the stock.   Examining short-term out-of-the-money puts, we find that following a five-day stock 
price drop of at least 10 percent, implied volatility is on average 25 percent higher than the 
realized volatility on the underlying stock over the remaining life of the option.  This large 
difference leads us to construct two profitable trading strategies, earning returns of between 15 
percent and 18 percent over a 30-day period.  
Our paper provides two significant contributions to the literature.  First, we extend the 
similar work of Amin, Coval and Seyhun (2004) on index options to individual stock options, 
providing evidence of overpricing of individual options following movements in the underlying.  
This overpricing is evidence of investor overreaction to recent information, whereas most prior 
literature has found option market overreaction only in the long term.  Secondly, we create 
simple trading strategies, which in contrast to the existing literature, show that there is a 
systematic way to profit from writing individual stock options and hedging. 
While there is no definite explanation of why we find mispricing and are able to profit 
from it, anecdotal evidence suggests that following sharp price declines unsophisticated investors 
may panic.  In panicking, these investors buy out-of-the-money puts on the stocks they own as 
insurance, causing the implied volatility of those options to rise, usually to levels higher than the 
volatility eventually realized by the underlying stock.  We implicitly assume limits to arbitrage, 
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which cause demand to have an impact on option prices, as modeled by Garleanu, Pedersen and 
Poteshman (2009).  This allows sophisticated investors to sell out-of-the-money puts on those 
stocks and delta-hedge, realizing significant profits.  This set of events leads us to three testable 
hypotheses.  First, following a sharp stock price decline, implied volatility should be higher than 
ex-post realized volatility.  Secondly, the steeper the drop, the higher the difference between 
implied and realized volatility should be.  Third, the implied volatility of these options should be 
higher than that of a control sample.  We find strong evidence for all of these hypotheses. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides a summary of 
existing literature and how our research contributes.  Section 2.3 describes our data and 
methodology.  Section 2.4 provides our main results relating to volatility.  Section 2.5 details our 
trading strategies.  We provide a summary and conclude in section 2.6. 
 
2.2  RELATED LITERATURE 
 Misreaction in the option market was first documented by Stein in 1989.  He finds that 
there is overreaction in long-term options relative to short-term options.  When short-term S&P 
100 index options‘ implied volatility moves, long-term options‘ implied volatility moves the 
same amount.  Since implied volatility follows a mean-reverting process, it should be the case 
that the long-term options‘ implied volatility moves less than that of short-term options.  The 
cause of this mispricing is investor overreaction to new information.  Poteshman (2001) 
documents both longer-term overreaction and shorter-term underreaction in the option market.  
Our paper adds to this string of research by providing evidence of overreaction to a specific type 
of information, and linking this overreaction to the stock market.  It is also notable that we see 
this overreaction in the short term, which has not been documented before. 
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 We take as given the relatively new idea that demand is instrumental in option pricing.  
This literature begins with Bollen and Whaley (2004), who show how investor demand affects 
the steepness of the implied volatility function of S&P 500 index options and 20 individual stock 
options.  First, the authors document the differences between implied volatility smiles of index 
options versus individual options.  Index smiles monotonically decrease, whereas individual 
smiles are more symmetric.  They also document that demand for puts is dominant in the market 
for index options, while demand for calls is dominant in the market for individual stock options.  
Thus, since the demand mechanisms and volatility functions are different for index versus 
individual options, we may expect different findings for those two categories.  For both types of 
option, the authors find evidence against the null hypothesis modeled by Black-Scholes where 
demand has no effect on option prices due to a horizontal supply curve.  Their evidence suggests 
that limits to arbitrage lead to demand affecting the shape of the IVF, and therefore the prices of 
options.  The authors also construct a simulated trading strategy in which options are sold and 
delta-hedged using underlying securities.  Before transactions costs, the strategies using index 
options are profitable, but those using individual stock options are not.   
Further evidence that demand determines the price of options is presented in the work of 
Garleanu, Pedersen and Poteshman (2009).  The authors develop a microstructure model 
showing how the demand of an option affects the prices and skews of that option and other 
options.  In particular, the effect on price from an increase in demand is proportional to the 
unhedgeable part of that option.  The effect on another option‘s price is proportional to the 
covariance of the unhedgeable parts of the two options.  The authors have a unique dataset 
containing direct data on demand, and they define net demand as the sum of long open interest 
minus the sum of short open interest for each investor category.  Regressions of daily excess 
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implied volatility, measured as the difference between Black-Scholes implied volatility and 
historical 60 day volatility (or realized ex-post volatility, or GARCH(1,1)) on net demand 
produce a positive and statistically significant coefficient.  Regressions of excess implied 
volatility skew on skewness in net demand also produce significantly positive coefficients.  
Excess implied volatility skew is defined as the average implied volatility from low moneyness 
options minus that from options with moneyness close to one, with moneyness equal to strike 
price divided by stock price.  The authors are, however, silent on the causes of demand.  This is 
where our paper fits in.  Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman provide the theoretical basis for our 
paper, and we extend their research by identifying a possible demand driver and showing its 
effect on individual option prices.   
Our paper is closely related to Amin, Coval, and Seyhun (2004).  Focusing solely on S&P 
100 index options, their paper examines the relationship between momentum in stock prices and 
option prices, with demand being the mechanism that links stock price to option price 
movements.  Two main tests are conducted.  The first is an examination of American option put-
call parity violations.  The authors find that 60-day stock price changes of 5 percent (-5 percent) 
or more (less) significantly increase the probability that parity will be violated due to high-priced 
calls (puts).  The second test compares the Black-Scholes implied volatility spread between calls 
and puts following 60-day stock market increases or decreases.  They find that following stock 
market increases, calls become overpriced relative to puts, and following stock market decreases, 
puts become overpriced relative to calls.  Regressions of volatility spread on past stock returns 
produce positive coefficients.  The authors also find that the steepness of the volatility smile is 
greater following stock market decreases than increases, for both calls and puts.  The spirit of our 
paper is quite similar.  However, our paper differs from, and adds to, this research in two 
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important ways.  First, we look at the individual equity options that make up the S&P 100, rather 
than options on the index itself.  Second, we look at much shorter and more extreme stock price 
changes.  Thus, we are not focusing on momentum, but rather overreaction to extreme 
information in the short term.   
Several papers provide evidence on the expensiveness of put options on the S&P indices.  
Coval and Shumway (2001) show that the expected returns of puts are negative, while the 
expected returns of calls are positive.  Bondarenko (2003) generalizes the martingale restriction 
of the CAPM and the model of Rubinstein (1976) to include an entire class of models.  This 
more general restriction holds even with sample biases and incorrect beliefs of investors.  
However, put option prices are still too high to be rationally explained.  We provide evidence 
that given a recent sharp decline in stock price, put options on individual equities also become 
overpriced. 
In summary, our contributions to the existing literature are twofold.  We extend the work 
of Coval and Shumway (2001), Amin, Coval, and Seyhun (2004) and Bondarenko (2003) on 
index options to the market for options on individual stocks.  We provide evidence on the 
overpricing of individual equity options, as well as short-term investor overreaction in the 
options market to stock price changes.  We extend the work of Bollen and Whaley (2004) in 
terms of trading strategies.  Following their methodology, we find that after conditioning on past 
stock returns, a strategy of selling individual stock options and delta hedging is profitable before 
trading costs, whereas they did not find any significant profits without said conditioning.  Thus, 
we show that investors consistently overreact in the options market for individual stocks, and this 
overreaction can be taken advantage of via an appropriate trading strategy. 
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2.3  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Our empirical tests involve options on S&P 100 stocks from 1996 to 2004.  Using these 
stocks will reduce problems from small stock biases and liquidity issues.  Option data are 
obtained from Ivy DB OptionMetrics.  This database includes implied volatilities, which are 
computed using a binomial tree that incorporates the early exercise feature (individual equity 
options are American options).  We also use this dataset for bid and offer option prices, exercise 
prices, maturity dates, volume, and option deltas.  Each option we use must have a positive 
volume, positive implied volatility, and a best bid price greater than $0.24.  We obtain stock 
prices from the CRSP database, and require that prices be available every day while a position is 
open for the purpose of computing holding returns and realized volatilities.  We define 
moneyness as strike price divided by stock price; deepest out-of-the-money puts (in-the-money 
calls) have moneyness less than 0.85, at-the-money options have moneyness between 0.95 and 
1.05, and deepest in-the-money puts (out-of-the-money calls) have moneyness greater than 1.15.  
For robustness, we also conduct our analysis using option delta as moneyness.  We sort options 
according to moneyness category and days to maturity.  Our analysis is performed using the 
averages of implied volatility and expensiveness for each moneyness/maturity combination. 
We perform our analysis in event time, an event being a stock price change of greater 
than 10 percent or greater than 20 percent in either direction during a five-day window.  To avoid 
counting the same event twice, we require that no event has occurred in the prior five days.  Our 
measure of expensiveness is the Black-Scholes implied volatility minus the ex-post realized 
volatility of the underlying stock over the remaining life of the option.  We compare this measure 
across moneyness categories, holding maturity constant.  Our hypothesis is that, due to demand 
pressure sparked by a steep stock price decline, out-of-the-money puts will become overpriced.  
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We also expect that a steeper stock price drop will result in more pronounced put overpricing.  
Since the volatility implied by the Black-Scholes formula is not an ideal measure, we do not 
focus on absolute magnitudes, but rather employ three benchmarks.  The first is to look at the 
difference in expensiveness following a stock price increase and decrease of the same percentage 
(i.e., 10 percent or 20 percent), and the second is to look at two different levels of drops and 
increases (i.e., a 10 percent drop (increase) versus a 20 percent drop (increase)).  The third is a 
control sample which excludes any options which have a stock price event in the previous five 
days. 
 
2.4  MAIN VOLATILITY RESULTS 
The first results in this paper relate to the difference between implied volatility of an 
option and the realized volatility of its underlying following underlying stock price movements.  
This is our measure of expensiveness.  Since implied volatility is a forward-looking measure, the 
most appropriate comparison is with the ex-post realized volatility for the remaining life of the 
option, rather than historical volatility measures.  We find that implied volatility is driven up 
very high following extreme stock price movements—in fact, it is too high, since the actual 
realized volatility turns out to be much lower.   
Unconditional implied volatilities are presented in Table 2.1.  This table provides a base 
case against which to compare our conditional results.  These implied volatilities are in line with 
those reported by previous studies, and show the typical volatility smile, which is steeper for 
shorter maturity options.  Table 2.2 reports implied volatilities conditional on stock price events 
of at least 10 percent in magnitude. After such an event, all of the implied volatilities are higher 
than the unconditional implied volatilities.  Figure 2.1 shows this clearly for the shortest maturity 
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puts, and Figure 2.2 shows the same upward shift for the shortest maturity calls.  Negative price 
movements appear to have a larger impact on implied volatilities than do positive price 
movements, although there is a caveat that the price events may not be of the same magnitudes 
on either side.  Table 2.3 reports similar findings, this time conditioning on even more extreme 
stock price movements of at least 20 percent in magnitude.  As expected, the implied volatilities 
shoot up even higher. 
High implied volatilities on their own do not imply overpricing.  Table 2.4 compares 
these implied volatilities to the volatilities actually realized over the remaining life of the 
options.  Since implied volatility is supposed to be a predictor of the ex-post volatility, it is 
interesting to see how far off it actually is following these stock price events.  Following a stock 
price decrease of at least 10 percent, short-term out-of-the-money puts have an implied volatility 
which is 25.3 percent higher than the actual realized volatility.  Following at least a 20 percent 
drop, this difference increases to 27.5 percent (Table 2.5).  As a benchmark, these numbers can 
be compared to the average unconditional volatility differences for short term puts of 16.1 
percent, reported in Table 2.6.  The volatility difference for short-term, out-of-the-money puts 
following the 10 percent stock price drop is about twice as high as it is unconditionally, and this 
difference is significant at the 5 percent level (t-statistic 2.27).  It should be noted that while this 
volatility difference is most pronounced for short-term out-of-the-money put options, it remains 
positive across all moneyness categories and all maturities, as well as for calls (following the 10 
percent minimum drop).  It is also striking that following 10 percent and 20 percent minimum 
increases in stock price, there is a significant difference between implied and realized volatility 
as well.  The relationship between volatility differences following 10 percent decreases, 10 
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percent increases and without conditioning upon stock price changes can be seen in Figures 2.3 
(puts) and 2.4 (calls).     
While there are many possible explanations for the observed relationship, we believe that 
the likely reason for the ―negative shock‖ graph in Figure 2.3 being highest is that following 
stock decreases, people tend to panic, and their increased demand drives the put prices (and by 
put-call parity, the call prices) up too high.  This theory is supported by data on trading volume, 
which are shown in Figure 2.5.  This figure shows the number of short-term, out-of-the-money 
put options traded on a daily basis surrounding a five-day stock price decrease of 10 percent.  In 
the figure, Day 0 corresponds to the trading day after the five-day stock price drop has been 
recorded.  The figure is consistent with the fact that our choice of five days for a stock price 
event is somewhat arbitrary, but is a reasonable timeframe.  We can see that the volume 
increases sharply at Day -2, and stays high for several more days before tapering off.  As for the 
positive shock graph, following a sharp price increase, investors may become too exuberant, 
pushing the price of calls too high in an attempt to lever up their investments.  This investor 
overreaction helps explain why following stock price movements, there is an increased 
difference between realized and implied volatilities.  It also helps explain why this difference 
increases the sharper is the stock price movement—investors simply tend to panic (or 
conversely, get excited) more as movement increases.  
Given the large magnitude of these differences, and hence the expensiveness of options, 
the natural question which arises is how sophisticated investors can systematically take 
advantage of this overreaction in the option market.  This leads us to the next section, which 
focuses on trading strategies. 
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2.5  TRADING STRATEGIES 
A good question to ask when hearing about security mispricing is, ―Can I profit from 
this?‖  In this section, we construct trading strategies which take advantage of the overpriced, 
short-maturity, out-of-the-money puts.  We follow the general methodology of Bollen and 
Whaley (2004) in order to be able to compare our results to theirs.  We find that when 
conditioning the strategy on prior stock price performance, we find statistically significant profits 
(before trading costs) from selling the overpriced puts and delta-hedging daily until the option‘s 
expiration date, and from variations on this strategy. 
From the results reported in the previous section, we see that the most extreme 
overpricing of puts occurs in the shortest maturity, deepest out-of-the-money options.  The 
anecdotal evidence from the Wall Street Journal also points us in the direction of the shortest 
maturity options.  These will also have the fewest liquidity problems.  For these reasons, this is 
where we focus our strategy—we use options with 30 days or less left to maturity and 
moneyness (strike divided by stock price) of 0.85 or less.  The average position is held for 15 
days, so we also present returns rescaled on a monthly basis for purposes of comparison.  We 
adjust for the dividends paid during the time the position is held, and use the one-month Treasury 
bill rate as the risk-free rate.  We condition on stock market movements in the following way: we 
open a position only after observing a five-day drop of 10 percent or more in a stock‘s price.  As 
before, to avoid double counting, we do not allow more than one stock price event to occur in 
any five-day period.   
In our first strategy, we sell the overpriced puts at the bid-ask midpoint and delta-hedge 
the position on a daily basis once an event is observed.  The returns to this strategy are computed 
according to the following formula: 
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where Δt is the option delta on date t, St is the closing price of the stock on date t, Dt is the 
dividend paid on the stock at date t, p0 is the price of the option on the date the position is 
opened, pT is the greater of zero or the strike price of the option minus the stock price on the 
expiration date of the option, and r is the risk-free rate.  Since we are selling both the puts and 
the stock, there is no initial outlay; instead, there is an inflow.  So, the returns to the trading 
strategy can be interpreted as the amount of the initial inflow that we get to keep after the 
positions are closed out.   
The first term in the numerator is the gain or loss from selling delta shares of the 
underlying at the time the position is opened, and holding those shares until the position is closed 
out at the expiration date of the option.  The second term in the numerator is the gain or loss 
from selling the put and closing out the position at the expiration of the option.  The third term of 
the numerator accounts for the daily gains or losses resulting from adjusting the delta hedge on a 
daily basis.  The denominator simply gives us a way to scale and compare profits.  As reported in 
Panel A of Table 2.7, the per transaction profit is $0.81 (t-statistic 11.23), and the 30-day return 
to this strategy is 17.12 percent (t-statistic 10.99).  The second strategy mirrors the first, but with 
the puts being sold at the bid price, rather than at the bid-ask midpoint.  This takes into account 
the trading costs from selling the option.  This strategy produces a per transaction profit of $0.77 
(t-statistic 10.54); the 30-day return is 15.91 percent (t-statistic 10.10).  As a back-of-the-
envelope calculation of trading costs on the stock, we assume that these hedging transactions are 
done in large amounts, and commissions on S&P 100 stocks are about $0.05 per share.  Since the 
average total number of shares sold is less than two, incorporating trading costs reduces our 
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profits from $0.77 to about $0.67.  Our third strategy is a way around the costs of daily delta-
hedging.  In this strategy, we delta-hedge on the day the position is opened, and simply hold that 
stock position until the option expires.  Thus, we significantly cut our transaction costs of delta-
hedging.  The returns to this strategy are calculated as follows: 
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Here, all terms are defined as before.  The only change in return computation is the omission of 
the term calculating mark-to-market gains and losses.  The per-transaction profit to this strategy 
(before trading costs) is $0.27 (t-statistic 4.99), and the 30-day return is 4.81 percent (t-statistic 
4.24).   
To verify that these returns are abnormal, we constructed a control sample and ran the 
same analysis.  The control sample was constructed to exclude the options that are included in 
our main results.  Thus, none of the positions held in the control sample strategy have 
experienced a stock price event in the previous five days.  The positions that are opened were 
randomly chosen and have a similar sample size to the previous results.  Results are reported in 
Panel B of Table 2.7.    For strategies 1 and 2, the returns are about half that of the conditional 
strategy, and are not as strongly significant.  Strategy 3 does not outperform the control sample. 
As another robustness check, we ran these strategies without opening any positions in the five 
days before option expiration with nearly identical results.  We have also tested the strategies 
using delta to define moneyness, with similar results.   
Next we address the problem of having non-independent observations, which comes from 
the fact that we have more than one option per stock for a given event day when we open a 
position.  To adjust for this, we add together all the positions for a given company on a given 
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position-open day.  This means we now have one aggregate position per company, rather than 
several separate positions.  As shown in Table 2.8, our returns to each strategy are higher.  The t-
statistics decrease but are still very high.  
We also conduct our trading strategy in calendar time and find significantly positive 
returns.  Doing this demonstrates that the strategy is implementable for a real-world investor.  
Results are reported in Table 2.9.  When selling puts at the bid-ask midpoint, the strategy earns 
10.5 percent per month (t-statistic 7.6), with a Sharpe ratio of 1.00.  More realistically, when puts 
are sold at the bid price, the strategy earns 9.5 per month (t-statistic 6.8), with a Sharpe ratio of 
0.89.  Furthermore, Figure 2.6 shows that this strategy earns positive returns in nearly every 
month in which positions are held from 1996 to 2004.  Three-factor model regression results are 
shown in Table 2.10.  When the dependent variable of the monthly return (selling at the bid) 
minus the risk-free rate is regressed on the three standard Fama-French factors, it produces an 
alpha of 9.39 (t-statistic 7.24).  In addition to positive average returns, we also find that our first 
two strategies earn a profit over 84 percent of the time, while the single delta-hedge strategy 
earns a profit over 63 percent of the time.   
 
2.6  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we start by examining the difference between implied volatility and realized 
volatility of individual stocks in the S&P 100 following sharp price movements, as a method of 
determining the expensiveness of options.  We find that following a stock price decrease of at 
least 10 percent, implied volatility of puts exceeds the ex-post realized volatility of the 
underlying stock by 25.3 percent.  For a stock price drop of at least 20 percent, the volatility 
difference is 27.5 percent.   
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One possible explanation for this difference is that put options become overpriced 
following extreme recent stock price drops due to the demand generated by panicking investors.  
Following stock price increases, call options become similarly overpriced.  The rationale here is 
that investors become overly excited following sharp price run-ups and buy calls to take 
advantage of further expected run-ups in stock prices. 
Given the large difference between implied and realized volatilities, there should be a 
way to systematically profit from writing stock options.  We examine three trading strategies.  
We follow the methodology of Bollen and Whaley (2004), with the exception that we confine 
our option sales to times following a significant stock drop (later work will include trading 
strategies following stock price increases).  Our work shows that one can profit significantly 
from selling options, provided they do so following significant stock price movements.   
Overall, our paper follows most closely in the spirit of Amin, Coval and Seyhun (2004) 
and Bollen and Whaley (2004).  While the former examines index option prices following stock 
price movements, our paper complements it by doing similar work with individual stock options.  
The latter paper examines trading strategies (in addition to explaining how demand drives 
implied volatility) for both individual equities and the S&P 100 index.  We find results which 
extend theirs by conditioning the trading strategies on stock price movements.  We are able to 
find a systematic way of profiting from selling individual stock options.  We believe that we are 
the first to document such a trading strategy with significant profits.  Further trading strategies 
we plan to construct include in-the-money call options following stock price decreases, and out-
of-the-money calls and in-the-money puts following stock price increases.     
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2.8  TABLES AND FIGURES  
Table 2.1:  Unconditional Implied Volatilities 
Implied volatilities are reported, without conditioning on prior stock returns.  Call and put options are 
sorted by moneyness and days to maturity.  Moneyness is defined as strike price divided by stock price.  
Moneyness (X/S) <0.85 0.85-0.95 0.95-1.05 1.05-1.15 >1.15 
      
Panel A: Calls  
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.713 0.398 0.314 0.398 0.611 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.512 0.354 0.304 0.341 0.481 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.458 0.337 0.296 0.315 0.427 
>91 Days To Maturity 0.400 0.327 0.299 0.297 0.358 
      
Panel B: Puts 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.744 0.450 0.323 0.370 0.620 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.561 0.380 0.310 0.331 0.477 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.493 0.351 0.304 0.318 0.423 
>91 Days To Maturity 0.406 0.325 0.305 0.311 0.366 
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Table 2.2:  Implied Volatilities Following Extreme 5-Day Returns (+/-10%) 
Implied volatilities are reported conditioned on a prior 5-day stock return of at least 10 percent in 
magnitude. Call and put options are sorted by moneyness and days to maturity.  Moneyness is defined as 
strike price divided by stock price.   
Moneyness (X/S) <0.85 0.85-0.95 0.95-1.05 1.05-1.15 >1.15 
      
Panel A: Calls After At Least 10% Return 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.826 0.542 0.481 0.527 0.679 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.644 0.486 0.458 0.472 0.594 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.589 0.465 0.450 0.452 0.537 
>91 Days To Maturity 0.529 0.456 0.441 0.440 0.492 
      
Panel B: Calls After At Most -10% Return 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.998 0.649 0.578 0.599 0.750 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.737 0.572 0.532 0.520 0.623 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.664 0.522 0.496 0.486 0.547 
>91 Days To Maturity 0.591 0.501 0.484 0.469 0.503 
      
Panel C: Puts After At Least 10% Return 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.793 0.570 0.500 0.536 0.758 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.664 0.505 0.468 0.483 0.605 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.603 0.479 0.457 0.463 0.577 
>91 Days To Maturity 0.545 0.458 0.446 0.457 0.523 
      
Panel D: Puts After At Most -10% Return 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.907 0.647 0.551 0.550 0.817 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.751 0.575 0.522 0.516 0.648 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.677 0.520 0.489 0.482 0.579 
>91 Days To Maturity 0.591 0.487 0.477 0.463 0.524 
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Table 2.3:  Implied Volatilities Following Extreme 5-Day Returns (+/-20%) 
Implied volatilities are reported conditioned on a prior 5-day stock return of at least 20 percent in 
magnitude. Call and put options are sorted by moneyness and days to maturity.  Moneyness is defined as 
strike price divided by stock price.  
Moneyness (X/S) <0.85 0.85-0.95 0.95-1.05 1.05-1.15 >1.15 
      
Panel A: Calls After At Least 20% Return 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 1.171 0.741 0.692 0.706 0.830 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.911 0.666 0.633 0.644 0.755 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.857 0.614 0.672 0.612 0.706 
>91 Days To Maturity 0.718 0.571 0.575 0.592 0.675 
      
Panel B: Calls After At Most -20% Return 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 1.135 0.832 0.779 0.806 0.968 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.930 0.723 0.727 0.681 0.798 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.778 0.652 0.634 0.625 0.679 
>91 Days To Maturity 0.664 0.581 0.631 0.572 0.599 
      
Panel C: Puts After At Least 20% Return 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.998 0.739 0.726 0.752 0.974 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.897 0.667 0.638 0.691 0.720 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.792 0.597 0.667 0.617 0.787 
>91 Days To Maturity 0.756 0.580 0.595 0.625 0.744 
      
Panel D: Puts After At Most -20% Return 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 1.226 0.856 0.800 0.751 1.046 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.981 0.692 0.765 0.645 0.835 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.793 0.643 0.614 0.618 0.707 
>91 Days To Maturity 0.705 0.567 0.627 0.565 0.620 
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Table 2.4:  Implied Volatility Minus Realized Volatility Following Extreme 5-Day Returns (+/-10%) 
This table shows our measure of expensiveness of options, conditioned on a prior 5-day stock return of at 
least 10 percent in magnitude. A positive number indicates an overpriced option.  Moneyness is defined 
as strike price divided by stock price. Implied volatility is from OptionMetrics, and is calculated using a 
binomial model. Realized volatility is the stock’s volatility over the remaining life of the option following an 
extreme stock price movement.  It is calculated as 


N
i
iRrv
1
2
*252 , where Ri is the daily stock 
return, and i indexes the stocks in the sample which have met the prior 5-day return requirements. 
Moneyness (X/S) <0.85 0.85-0.95 0.95-1.05 1.05-1.15 >1.15 
      
Panel A: Calls After At Least 10% Return 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.261 -0.017 -0.068 -0.056 0.029 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.107 -0.040 -0.056 -0.062 -0.010 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.029 -0.074 -0.091 -0.096 -0.034 
>91 Days To Maturity -0.008 -0.090 -0.086 -0.092 -0.050 
      
Panel B: Calls After At Most -10% Return 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.296 0.028 -0.058 -0.057 0.026 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.139 0.004 -0.072 -0.080 -0.023 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.085 -0.014 -0.085 -0.101 -0.058 
>91 Days To Maturity 0.029 -0.073 -0.100 -0.101 -0.079 
      
Panel C: Puts After At Least 10% Return 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.176 0.004 -0.053 -0.025 0.141 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.102 -0.026 -0.036 -0.056 0.022 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.031 -0.049 -0.071 -0.073 0.005 
>91 Days To Maturity 0.026 -0.058 -0.059 -0.071 -0.013 
      
Panel D: Puts After At Most -10% Return 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.253 0.038 -0.046 -0.053 0.164 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.144 0.003 -0.063 -0.056 0.047 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.114 -0.031 -0.069 -0.112 -0.009 
>91 Days To Maturity 0.051 -0.069 -0.087 -0.080 -0.052 
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Table 2.5:  Implied Volatility Minus Realized Volatility Following Extreme 5-Day Returns (+/-20%) 
This table shows our measure of expensiveness of options, conditioned on a prior 5-day stock return of at 
least 20 percent in magnitude. A positive number indicates an overpriced option.  Moneyness is defined 
as strike price divided by stock price. Implied volatility is from OptionMetrics, and is calculated using a 
binomial model. Realized volatility is the stock’s volatility over the remaining life of the option following an 
extreme stock price movement.  It is calculated as 


N
i
iRrv
1
2
*252 , where Ri is the daily stock 
return, and i indexes the stocks in the sample which have met the prior 5-day return requirements. 
Moneyness (X/S) <0.85 0.85-0.95 0.95-1.05 1.05-1.15 >1.15 
      
Panel A: Calls After At Least 20% Return 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.232 -0.029 -0.143 -0.151 -0.045 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.247 -0.012 -0.035 -0.114 0.095 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.035 -0.029 0.055 -0.262 0.109 
>91 Days To Maturity 0.107 -0.020 -0.065 -0.094 0.034 
      
Panel B: Calls After At Most –20% Return 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.232 0.099 -0.003 0.042 -0.075 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.233 0.136 -0.092 0.078 -0.026 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.055 -0.073 0.020 -0.122 -0.084 
>91 Days To Maturity -0.023 -0.054 -0.171 -0.068 -0.177 
      
Panel C: Puts After At Least 20% Return 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.124 -0.029 -0.029 -0.227 0.087 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.253 0.075 -0.038 -0.086 0.060 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.080 -0.023 0.015 -0.353 0.099 
>91 Days To Maturity 0.133 -0.007 -0.015 -0.143 0.109 
      
Panel D: Puts After At Most –20% Return 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.275 0.105 -0.006 0.046 0.253 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.253 0.106 -0.022 0.069 0.134 
61-91 Days To Maturity -0.026 -0.069 0.008 -0.152 -0.098 
>91 Days To Maturity -0.017 -0.053 -0.230 -0.064 -0.185 
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Table 2.6:  Unconditional Implied Volatility Minus Realized Volatility 
This table shows our measure of expensiveness of options, unconditionally. A positive number indicates 
an overpriced option.  Moneyness is defined as strike price divided by stock price. Implied volatility is from 
OptionMetrics, and is calculated using a binomial model. Realized volatility is the stock’s volatility over the 
remaining life of the option following an extreme stock price movement.  It is calculated as 



N
i
iRrv
1
2
*252 , where Ri is the daily stock return, and i indexes the stocks in the sample. 
Moneyness (X/S) <0.85 0.85-0.95 0.95-1.05 1.05-1.15 >1.15 
      
Panel A: Calls  
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.251 -0.088 -0.180 -0.125 -0.007 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.048 -0.138 -0.208 -0.200 -0.067 
61-91 Days To Maturity -0.002 -0.131 -0.190 -0.173 -0.072 
>91 Days To Maturity -0.074 -0.183 -0.219 -0.220 -0.138 
Average 0.056 -0.135 -0.199 -0.179 -0.071 
      
Panel B: Puts 
      
<31 Days To Maturity 0.161 -0.013 -0.169 -0.106 0.108 
31-61 Days To Maturity 0.078 -0.106 -0.198 -0.157 -0.016 
61-91 Days To Maturity 0.023 -0.110 -0.169 -0.142 -0.019 
>91 Days To Maturity -0.046 -0.156 -0.188 -0.170 -0.073 
Average 0.054 -0.096 -0.181 -0.144 0.000 
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Table 2.7: Trading Strategy Results 
This table shows the profits generated by three trading strategies.  Panel A presents results conditional 
on stock price movements.  For all three strategies, positions are only opened after a stock price 
decrease of at least 10 percent.  Panel B presents results from the control sample.  Strategy 1 sells puts 
at the bid-ask midpoints and delta hedges, adjusting the hedge on a daily basis.  Strategy 2 is the same 
as Strategy 1, except puts are sold at the bid price.  Strategy 3 sells puts at the bid price and delta 
hedges when the position is opened, and does not adjust the delta hedge.  The first row shows the 
average profit per position, the second row shows the returns to the strategy, which are interpreted as the 
percentage of the initial inflow the investor ultimately keeps, and the third row adjusts the returns so they 
are on a monthly basis. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
  
(A) 
Strategy 1:  
Sell put at bid-ask     
midpoint, daily 
delta-hedge 
(B) 
Strategy 2: 
  Sell put at bid, daily 
delta-hedge 
(C) 
Strategy 3: 
 Sell put at bid, initial 
delta hedge only 
Panel A: Conditional on Stock Price Drop 
    
$ per transaction                       $0.81                        $0.77                       $0.27  
 (11.23) (10.54) (4.99) 
    
% per transaction 11.88% 11.02% 3.45% 
 (10.84) (9.90) (4.53) 
    
30-day % 17.12% 15.91% 4.81% 
  (10.99) (10.10) (4.24) 
    
Panel B: Control Sample 
$ per transaction                       $0.42                        $0.37                       $0.31  
 (2.74) (2.39) (3.14) 
    
% per transaction 6.57% 5.74% 4.05% 
 (3.78) (3.29) (3.51) 
    
30-day % 8.96% 7.97% 5.69% 
  (4.39) (3.89) (4.14) 
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Table 2.8:  Aggregate Results Per Company Per Open Date 
This table shows the profits generated by three trading strategies when our positions are aggregated by 
company.  When a stock meets the prior return requirement, all that stock’s puts (which meet selection 
criteria) are combined into a single short position.  For all three strategies, positions are only opened after 
a stock price decrease of at least 10 percent.  Strategy 1 sells puts at the bid-ask midpoints and delta 
hedges, adjusting the hedge on a daily basis.  Strategy 2 is the same as Strategy 1, except puts are sold 
at the bid price.  Strategy 3 sells puts at the bid price and delta hedges when the position is opened, and 
does not adjust the delta hedge.  The first row shows the average profit per position, the second row 
shows the returns to the strategy, which are interpreted as the percentage of the initial inflow the investor 
ultimately keeps, and the third row adjusts the returns so they are on a monthly basis. T-statistics are in 
parentheses. 
  
(A) 
Strategy 1:           
 Sell put at bid-ask 
midpoint, daily delta-
hedge 
(B) 
Strategy 2:            
  Sell put at bid, daily 
delta-hedge  
(C) 
Strategy 3:           
          Sell put at bid, initial 
delta hedge only 
    
$ per transaction                       $1.49                       $1.41                        $0.60  
 (7.38) (7.07) (3.28) 
    
% per transaction 19.17% 17.97% 6.87% 
 (9.22) (8.63) (4.07) 
    
30-day % 32.49% 30.51% 12.80% 
  (9.28) (8.68) (4.56) 
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Table 2.9: Calendar-Time Strategy Results 
This table shows the monthly return to each of the three strategies when implemented in calendar time.  
For all three strategies, positions are only opened after a stock price decrease of at least 10 percent.  
Strategy 1 sells puts at the bid-ask midpoints and delta hedges, adjusting the hedge on a daily basis.  
Strategy 2 is the same as Strategy 1, except puts are sold at the bid price.  Strategy 3 sells puts at the bid 
price and delta hedges when the position is opened, and does not adjust the delta hedge.  The Sharpe 
ratio for each strategy is also presented, and t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
  
(A) 
Strategy 1:           
 Sell put at bid-ask 
midpoint, daily delta-
hedge 
(B) 
Strategy 2:            
  Sell put at bid, daily 
delta-hedge  
(C) 
Strategy 3:           
          Sell put at bid, initial 
delta hedge only 
    
Monthly Return 10.50%                       9.50%                        4.03%  
 (7.60) (6.80) (2.70) 
    
Sharpe Ratio 1.00 0.88 0.35 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.10: Fama-French Three Factor Model Results 
This table reports the results of regressions of monthly 
calendar returns on the market risk premium, size factor and 
book-to-market factor.  The dependent variable is the return 
from Strategy 2, where put options are sold at the bid price 
after a stock price decrease of at least 10 percent has been 
observed, and delta hedging is performed daily. 
 Estimate t-statistic 
Alpha 9.39 7.24 
MRP -0.72 -2.32 
SMB 0.10 0.35 
HML 0.42 1.14 
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Figure 2.1   
Shortest maturity implied volatilities by moneyness category: puts. Category 1 puts are 
out of the money. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 
Shortest maturity implied volatilities by moneyness category: calls. Category 1 calls are 
in the money. 
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Figure 2.3 
Shortest maturity volatility difference when absolute return is greater than 10%: puts. 
Moneyness category 1 puts are out of the money. 
 
 
Figure 2.4:   
Shortest maturity volatility difference when absolute return is greater than 10%: calls. 
Moneyness category 1 calls are in the money. 
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Figure 2.5:  Put Option Volume Around Extreme Stock Price Drops  
This figure shows number of short-term, out-of-the-money put contracts traded on a 
daily basis surrounding a 5-day stock price drop of at least 10 percent.  Day 0 
corresponds to the trading day after the 5-day price drop was recorded. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 
Calendar-time trading strategy returns. 
 
 
OTM Put Volume
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Event Time (days)
V
o
lu
m
e
Calendar-Time Payoff
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
J
a
n
-9
6
J
a
n
-9
7
J
a
n
-9
8
J
a
n
-9
9
J
a
n
-0
0
J
a
n
-0
1
J
a
n
-0
2
J
a
n
-0
3
J
a
n
-0
4
Date
R
e
tu
rn
72 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: 
 
ACTIVELY MANAGED MUTUAL FUND RETURNS VERSUS THE S&P 500 INDEX 
 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
Should investors buy actively managed mutual funds in the hopes of beating the market, 
or are they better off putting their money in a passive index fund?  Do ―closet indexers‖ have 
better performance than managers employing more active strategies?  These are important 
questions, as mutual funds are the main investment vehicle for millions of people.  The mutual 
fund industry is huge, with assets managed valuing in the trillions of dollars.  The investments 
made by fund managers can have massive impacts on the economy as well as individuals‘ 
wealth.   
One of the easiest, cheapest ways for an individual investor to hold a diversified portfolio 
is to buy an index fund based on the S&P 500.  What if an investor wants to ―beat the market‖?  
Investing in such an index fund would not work, since the S&P 500 is widely taken to be a good 
proxy for ―the market‖.  In order to increase their return while staying diversified and not having 
to do the legwork themselves, many investors turn to actively managed funds.  These are funds 
whose managers claim to have enough skill to be able to pick the ―right‖ stocks at the ―right‖ 
time, and therefore provide investors with a higher return.  Of course, they charge higher fees 
than index funds in return for this valuable service.  What about funds that claim to have a 
specific strategy, but end up looking similar to the S&P 500—the so-called ―closet indexers‖?  
They are presumably charging higher fees in return for calling themselves an active fund, but 
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actually deviating little from the index.  One reason managers might do this is to minimize their 
tracking error.  Another, less honorable reason, would be to avoid doing the work of an active 
manager while still collecting the large fees.  How is the individual investor supposed to sort out 
this mess?  One must figure out if (truly) actively managed funds are worth the higher fees and 
how to spot closet-indexers.  These are the focuses of this paper.   
An important addition to the mutual fund benchmarking literature is that of Daniel, 
Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997)—hereafter referred to as DGTW—which develops 
benchmarks based on size, book-to-market and return momentum characteristics of the stocks 
held by a mutual fund.  Using holdings data, they create ―Characteristic Selectivity‖ and 
―Characteristic Timing‖ measures to break down performance into that due to a manager‘s stock 
picking capabilities and that due to his timing capabilities.  In the application of these measures 
to equity mutual fund data, they find that managers show some stock-picking ability (especially 
in growth funds), but no ability to time the market.  In this paper, I employ characteristic 
benchmarking based on the ―Characteristic Selectivity‖ measure of DGTW to help determine if 
active fund managers are good stock pickers. 
A question addressed in mutual fund literature is: do active mutual fund managers create 
value for investors?  Numerous studies have provided numerous answers to this question.  
Grinblatt and Titman (1989) utilize several mean-variance efficient benchmarks to determine 
that while some mutual funds outperform before fees, the fees investors must pay erase the gains.  
Malkiel (1995) addresses the issue of survivorship bias in mutual fund research, and finds that 
this accounts for previous findings of persistence in mutual fund performance in the 1980s.  He 
finds that on average, funds underperform benchmark portfolios even before fees.  Carhart 
(1997) also studies persistence in mutual fund performance.  He finds that the so-called ―hot 
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hands‖ phenomenon is entirely explained by a momentum effect.  The only persistence in mutual 
funds is by the poorest performers.  He concludes that fund managers do not exhibit skill. 
Wermers (2000) finds that the average mutual fund holds a stock portfolio that beats the 
S&P 500 index by 1.3 percent per year, but the addition of expenses drops the return to about 1 
percent below that of the benchmark.  Chen, Jegadeesh and Wermers (2000) examine both the 
holdings and the trades of mutual funds.  In examining the trades, they find that stocks that are 
bought perform significantly better than stocks that are sold.  In examining holdings, they find 
that stocks that are held by mutual funds do not outperform the average stock.  Taken together, 
these results indicate that managers do possess some selection skill, but that the gains from that 
skill are short lived because they hold the stocks longer than they can predict returns for them.  
Barras, Scaillet and Wermers (2007) base their analysis on the assumption that not all funds have 
a true value of alpha equal to zero, which is a common assumption made in mutual fund 
research.  Their aim is to separate luck from skill in interpreting mutual fund performance.  By 
employing Monte-Carlo tests, they find that less than 2 percent of funds have true alphas greater 
than zero, while 20 percent have true negative alphas.  The implication is that it is very difficult 
for an investor to identify the truly good funds.    
More recent research has begun to challenge the prevailing view that actively managed 
funds do not create value for investors.  Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005) study actively 
managed equity funds.  They create a measure of industry concentration and report that funds 
vary widely on their level of this measure.  They find that managers who concentrate their 
holdings in a few industries outperform those who are more diversified both before and after 
fees.  They then employ the characteristics benchmark of DGTW (1997) and conclude that this 
outperformance results from superior stock selection within those industries.  Similarly, Busse 
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and Tong (2007) study industry and stock selection by fund managers.  They conclude that 
industry selection explains about half of a fund‘s abnormal returns.  They also find that while 
industry selection ability persists, stock selection ability, after controlling for industry selectivity, 
does not.  Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White (2006) find that there are a small 
number of ―star‖ managers, mostly in funds with a growth strategy, who can persistently select 
stocks that offer superior returns, even after fees.  They employ a bootstrap technique in order to 
address nonnormality of mutual fund alphas.  They conclude that luck alone cannot account for 
these managers‘ performance: there is evidence of stock-picking skill.  
A paper related to this one is Cremers and Petajisto (2009).  They also create a variable 
that measures the similarity of holdings between a fund and a given benchmark.  Their measure, 
called ―Active Share‖ is essentially the difference in a stock‘s weight in the fund and in the 
index, summed over all stocks.  There are several differences here from what I do.  First, there 
are differences in benchmarks: I focus on the broad market, proxied by the S&P 500, while 
Cremers and Petajisto analyze 19 different indexes.  While at first blush, using different indexes 
may seem more ―correct,‖ I look at the issue from the standpoint of an average, uninformed 
investor.  This investor is unlikely to be familiar with, for example, the Russell 3000 value index, 
or to care if his fund beats it.  What he is likely to care about is ―the market.‖  Instead of 
essentially decomposing a given fund into a long-short portfolio of an index, as Active Share 
does, my measure of closet indexing is simply the percentage of a given fund that is made up of 
S&P 500 holdings.  I create both equal-weighted and value-weighted measures of this 
percentage.  I also use the r-squared of a regression of fund returns on S&P 500 returns as 
another measure of closet indexing.  Another difference between the two papers is the funds we 
analyze.  Cremers and Petajisto limit their study to 100 percent equity funds.  While I, too, focus 
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on primarily equity funds, I do allow for other holdings.  In regression analysis, we also calculate 
standard errors differently.  While my main results cluster by fund, which is perhaps more 
intuitive, I point out that if standard errors are clustered by month, most of the statistical 
significance goes away.  Their standard errors are clustered by year, with some of the results 
only marginally significant, or not at all.  If the clustering were done by month, it is possible that 
the statistical significance of those results would disappear.  Finally, while there is some overlap 
in our conclusions, there are some differences as well.  For example, I show that the results 
change when the market model is used to benchmark returns, and when standard errors are 
estimated more conservatively.  The interpretations are also slightly different, given the different 
index benchmarks.  In general, both studies find that more actively managed funds produce 
higher returns. 
The majority of my results indicate that mutual fund managers do, indeed, provide value 
to their investors, on the order of two percent per year.  However, using the market model as a 
benchmark produces opposite results, while if standard errors are calculated using clustering by 
month rather than by fund, then the statistical significance of most of the results disappears. This 
last point also raises concerns that other papers that have found statistically significant results 
may have only found them due to their method of standard error calculation.  The most intuitive 
means of determining managers‘ stock-picking ability, however, remains robust to the more 
conservative standard error approach. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 describes my data and 
methodology, Section 3.3 presents empirical findings, and Section 3.4 concludes. 
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3.2  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Mutual fund data are taken from two databases.  Quarterly after-fee fund returns and 
expense ratios are from the CRSP mutual fund database.  If a fund is missing quarters (e.g., if it 
reports semi-annually), the quarter previous to the missing one is carried forward.  Total net 
assets and fund equity holdings by stock are from Thompson Financial‘s CDA database.  To 
ensure that I am focusing on equity funds, I require that a fund have at least 20 stocks and at least 
$20 million in equity holdings to be included in the sample.  Stock return data are from CRSP, 
and accounting data are from Compustat.  I exclude ADRs and closed-end funds; stocks require 
at least two years‘ worth of Compustat data to be included.  Industry classifications are based on 
the 49 Fama-French industries.  Industry classifications and market factors are obtained from 
Ken French‘s website2.  Data cover 1984 to 2000.  Only funds covered by both the CRSP mutual 
fund and CDA databases are included.  The final sample contains 92,031 fund-months. 
The raw returns used in the analysis consist of before-fee and after-fee returns from the 
CRSP mutual fund database and before-fee holdings-based returns calculated using CDA fund 
holdings data and individual stock returns.  Before-fee CRSP returns are calculated by 
multiplying the after-fee monthly return by one plus the monthly expense ratio.  I employ several 
benchmarking methods to calculate excess returns.  For characteristic-benchmarked returns, I 
follow the methodology of DGTW (1997) in calculating their characteristic selectivity (CS) 
measure.  For each stock, I begin by calculating the industry-adjusted book-to-market ratio, 
market equity at the end of the previous December and the past twelve-month return ending in 
May.  Book-to-market is calculated as the log of last fiscal year‘s book equity divided by market 
equity at the end of the prior December.  Industry-adjusted book-to-market is firm book-to-
market minus industry book-to-market, normalized by the standard deviation of the difference.  I 
                                                     
2
 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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calculate characteristic benchmark returns in the following manner.  Each July, all NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ stocks in CRSP are sorted into portfolios based on NYSE market-equity 
quintiles.  Each of those portfolios is then sorted into book-to-market quintiles.  Finally, each of 
the 25 resulting portfolios is sorted into quintiles based on the twelve-month return ending in 
May of the portfolio formation year.  I end up with 125 portfolios each year, for which I 
calculate value-weighted monthly returns.  Each month, each stock in a fund is assigned to a 
benchmark portfolio.  The characteristic-benchmark return for each fund is the weighted average 
return of the benchmark portfolios to which its stocks are assigned.  The fund‘s excess return is 
the CRSP before-fee return, the CRSP after-fee return, or the weighted average of its stock 
returns (using holdings data) minus the characteristic-benchmark return.  I also use the market 
model and the four-factor model to benchmark the CRSP mutual fund returns.  To calculate 
factor loadings, I require three years of past return and accounting data and run regressions using 
the market model and the four-factor model.  The market model excess fund return is the raw 
fund return (both before-fee and after-fee) minus the predicted value from the regression, and the 
four-factor excess return is defined similarly.   
 To identify ―closet indexers,‖ I create three variables, using the Vanguard 500 holdings 
as a proxy for the S&P 500 holdings.  The first step is to calculate the monthly value-weighted 
return of the Vanguard 500.  I then calculate how closely a given fund‘s returns track those of the 
Vanguard 500 by using the r-squared of monthly OLS regressions.  Two full years of monthly 
returns are used to calculate r-squared; funds that do not meet this data requirement are dropped 
from the sample.  I use holdings-based returns in these regressions, but regressions run using 
CRSP mutual fund returns yield nearly identical results.  As shown in Table 3.1, the average r-
squared is 0.4929.  I also calculate equal-weighted and value-weighed measures based on how 
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much a given fund‘s holdings overlap with those of the Vanguard 500.  The equal-weighted 
measure is the total number of S&P stocks in a given fund divided by the total number of stocks 
in that fund.  The value-weighted measure is the total value of S&P stocks held in a given fund 
divided by the total value of that fund.  On average, 57.56 percent of a fund‘s stocks are S&P 
500 constituents, and 63.12 percent of a fund‘s value is made up of S&P 500 constituents. 
The main analysis is done using panel regressions.  The control variables are log fund 
assets, the reciprocal of the number of stocks in a fund, and fund turnover, since prior studies 
have shown these to be correlated with fund returns.  To be sure that outliers do not skew the 
analysis, I drop observations with values for control variables in the top and bottom 0.5 percent 
of the distrubution.  Regressions are all run using time fixed effects.  The dependent variables are 
before-fee and after-fee CRSP returns minus the risk-free rate, before-fee and after-fee market 
model excess CRSP returns, before-fee and after-fee four-factor model excess CRSP returns, 
before-fee and after-fee CRSP returns minus the characteristic-selectivity benchmark return, 
holdings-based returns minus the risk-free rate, and holdings-based returns minus the 
characteristic-selectivity benchmark return.  The average of each variable is reported in Table 
3.1, and correlations are presented in Table 3.2.  Each dependent variable is used in three 
regressions: on each of the closet-indexer independent variables with the inclusion of control 
variables. 
 
3.3  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The purpose of this paper is to determine if active mutual fund managers provide value 
over passive fund managers through their stock picking ability, and how sensitive results are to 
research design.  The variables of interest in the regressions are those that indicate how closely a 
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fund approximates the S&P 500 (the closet-index measures).  The coefficients on these measures 
provide information about the manager‘s skill in picking stocks.  Table 3.3 reports panel 
regression results for holdings-based returns calculated using CDA data.  These returns give the 
best picture of the manager‘s stock-picking skill.  The returns are limited to equity, whereas the 
CRSP returns can include returns from other asset classes included in the fund.  While managers 
may have skill in these other areas as well, my focus is on equities.  The r-squared coefficient 
indicates that the S&P 500 underperforms a hypothetical fund with zero r-squared by 2.62 
percent per year, significant at 5 percent.  Thus the returns on the stock holdings of a fund with 
an average level of active management (hereafter referred to as an average fund), with an r-
squared of 0.4929, beat the market by a significant 1.29 percent per year.  The index 
underperforms funds with no S&P 500 stocks by 3.11 percent (equal-weight) or 3.39 percent 
(value-weight) per year.  Both estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  These 
numbers indicate that an average fund, in which S&P 500 constituents make up 57.56 percent of 
the holdings by number and 63.12 percent by weight, outperforms the S&P 500 by 1.79 percent 
and 2.14 percent per year, respectively.   
Using raw before-fee CRSP fund returns, Panel A of Table 3.4 shows that the S&P 500 
underperforms a hypothetical fund with zero r-squared by 2.76 percent per year, significant at the 
5 percent level, implying that the average fund beats the S&P 500 by 1.35 percent per year.  The 
index underperforms funds with no S&P 500 stocks by 4.68 percent (equal-weight) or 4.42 
percent (value-weight) per year (both statistically significant at 1 percent).  These numbers 
indicate that an average fund outperforms the S&P 500 by 2.69 percent and 2.79 percent per 
year, respectively.  After-fee regressions, shown in Panel B, produce similar coefficients, 
although the gap between index and non-index fund returns narrows slightly.  The S&P 500 
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underperforms a zero r-squared fund by 2.48 percent per year after fees (significant at 5 percent), 
and underperforms a fund with no S&P 500 stocks by 4.36 percent (equal-weight) or 4.12 
percent (value-weight) per year (both significant at 1 percent).   My conclusion from the results 
shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 is that actively managed funds on average provide significant value 
to investors.  The more the manager deviates from the S&P 500, the higher the returns tend to be.  
This conclusion is likely what the average uninformed investor cares about.  They are unlikely to 
care whether excess performance comes from stock picking ability or timing ability, as long as 
they believe the excess performance exists.  This conclusion also indicates that investors need to 
be careful about investing in closet index funds.  Not only will they get lower before-fee returns 
than the average actively managed fund, but they will also be paying higher fees than they would 
if investing in an ―official‖ index fund.   
My next step is to see how these regressions change when excess returns calculated using 
various benchmarks are used in place of raw returns as the dependent variables.  Using DGTW‘s 
characteristic selectivity measure as a benchmark for the CRSP data produces the same signs and 
significance levels as the original regressions, and the overlap variables‘ coefficients have a 
similar magnitude as well.  Panel A of Table 3.5 shows that the before-fee coefficients are -4.65 
percent (equal-weight) and -4.71 percent (value-weight), both significant at 1 percent.  Panel B 
shows the after-fee coefficients: -4.33 percent (equal-weight) and -4.41 percent (value-weight), 
also significant at 1 percent.  The r-squared coefficient is lower in magnitude, at –1.25 percent 
per year before fees, significant at 5 percent and -0.99 percent per year after fees, which is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  Panel C presents the results using holding-based 
returns and the CS benchmark.  The coefficient on r-squared is -1.13 percent, significant at 5 
percent.  The coefficients on the equal-weight and value-weight measures are -3.35 percent and  
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-3.40 percent, respectively, both significant at 1 percent.  Using the characteristic selectivity 
benchmark to calculate excess returns does not materially alter the results using raw returns.  
This adds credence to the conclusion that active managers can pick stocks that ultimately 
outperform other stocks that have similar size, book-to-market, and past returns.   
When using the Fama-French four factor model as a benchmark, the signs from the 
previous regressions do not change.  However, the magnitudes and significance decrease, as 
shown in Table 3.6.  Before fees, the coefficient on r-squared is close to zero and insignificant.  
The coefficients on the equal-weighted and value-weighted measures are -0.94 percent and -0.85 
percent, respectively, both significant at the 5 percent level.  After fees, none of the coefficients 
are significant.  This indicates that once the variation due to the overall market, book-to-market, 
size, and momentum is removed, the returns of actively managed funds barely outperform the 
S&P 500 before fees, and essentially match it after fees.  For the average investor, these results 
still suggest that it is better to purchase an actively managed fund, since the fees associated with 
purchasing an index fund are not accounted for in this analysis.  However, the benefit to doing so 
is not economically large.     
While interesting, these results are not robust to all benchmarking or standard error 
calculation methods.  Signs change when using the market model as a benchmark for the CRSP 
data.  As reported in Table 3.7, this regression actually shows that the S&P 500 index beats 
unrelated funds by a significant 1.5 percent to 2 percent per year.  When using the more 
conservative approach of clustering standard errors by month instead of by fund, most of the 
statistical significance of the results goes away.  As an example of the typical results using this 
method of standard error calculation, Table 3.8 shows that all of the t-statistics on the closet 
index measures have dropped below one.  A notable exception to this pattern is when excess 
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returns are calculated using the CS benchmark.  These results are reported in Table 3.9, which 
shows that the closet index measure coefficients have maintained their levels of significance for 
all three types of dependent variable: before-fee CRSP, after-fee CRSP and holdings-based 
returns.  Because this benchmark is the best method of determining stock-picking ability, and 
(according to DGTW [1997]), ―characteristic-matching should have more statistical power to 
detect abnormal performance than factor models,‖ the ultimate conclusion of this paper is that 
actively managed mutual funds do provide value to investors when compared with the broad 
market index.  
   
3.4  CONCLUSION 
The general conclusion of this paper is that actively managed funds provide higher 
returns, both before and after fees, than index or closet index funds.  These funds outperform a 
pure index fund by about two percent per year, which is statistically significant.  The conclusion, 
however, is not without its caveats.  The answer can become less clear-cut, depending on method 
of benchmarking and how standard errors are calculated.  These findings should serve as a 
caution when interpreting the results of other studies, many of which do not specify their 
methods of calculating standard errors or use a less conservative approach.  In this paper, the 
most intuitive means of determining managers‘ stock-picking ability—the DGTW (1997) 
characteristic selectivity benchmark—remains robust to the more conservative standard error 
approach.   
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3.6  TABLES  
 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics: Means       
This table reports the monthly means and standard deviations and the number of 
fund-month observations for all mutual funds in the sample covering 1984 to 
2000.  Statistics are reported for dependent and independent variables used in 
later regressions. Returns are on a monthly basis. 
Panel A: Independent Variables       
Variable Mean Std Dev N 
R-squared 0.4929 0.3055 92031 
# of S&P stocks/Total # of stocks in mutual fund 0.5756 0.3045 92031 
Value-weight % of mutual fund 0.6312 0.3079 92031 
Log assets 19.6576 1.4127 92031 
Turnover 0.0552 0.0579 92031 
1/number of stocks 0.0184 0.0101 92031 
    
Panel B: Dependent Variables       
Variable Mean Std Dev N 
Before-fee return  0.0141 0.0495 92031 
After-fee return 0.0132 0.0494 92031 
Market-model before-fee return 0.0003 0.0277 92031 
Market-model after-fee return -0.0002 0.0288 92031 
Four-factor model before-fee return 0.0005 0.0210 92031 
Four-factor model after-fee return -0.0004 0.0210 92031 
CS benchmark before-fee return 0.0001 0.0214 92031 
CS benchmark after-fee return -0.0008 0.0214 92031 
Holdings-based raw return 0.0150 0.0540 92031 
Holdings-based CS benchmark return 0.0010 0.0209 92031 
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Correlations                   
This table reports matrices showing Pearson correlation coefficients for the dependent and independent variables used in the regression 
analysis. 
Panel A: Independent Variables                     
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       R-squared 1.0000 0.2853 0.2901 
       
           # of S&P stocks/Total # of stocks in 
fund 0.2853 1.0000 0.9729 
       
           Value-weight % of mutual fund 0.2901 0.9729 1.0000               
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           Table 3.2 (Cont)                     
Panel B: Dependent Variables                     
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Before-fee 1.0000 1.0000 0.3930 0.4328 0.2274 0.2273 0.3641 0.3622 0.9472 0.4527 
           After-fee 1.0000 1.0000 0.3930 0.4329 0.2274 0.2274 0.3639 0.3621 0.9472 0.4526 
           MM excess before-fee 0.3930 0.3930 1.0000 0.9730 0.5971 0.5970 0.5365 0.5362 0.3182 0.4403 
           MM excess after-fee 0.4328 0.4329 0.9730 1.0000 0.5765 0.5766 0.5464 0.5461 0.3587 0.4608 
           FF excess before-fee 0.2274 0.2274 0.5971 0.5765 1.0000 0.9998 0.4553 0.4552 0.1703 0.3669 
           FF excess after-fee 0.2273 0.2274 0.5970 0.5766 0.9998 1.0000 0.4549 0.4551 0.1702 0.3666 
           CS benchmark before-fee  0.3641 0.3639 0.5365 0.5464 0.4553 0.4549 1.0000 0.9999 0.1942 0.6619 
           CS benchmark after-fee  0.3622 0.3621 0.5362 0.5461 0.4552 0.4551 0.9999 1.0000 0.1923 0.6613 
           Holdings-based raw 0.9472 0.9472 0.3182 0.3587 0.1703 0.1702 0.1942 0.1923 1.0000 0.5402 
           Holdings-based CS benchmark 0.4527 0.4526 0.4403 0.4608 0.3669 0.3666 0.6619 0.6613 0.5402 1.0000 
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Table 3.3: Dependent Variable: Holdings-Based Returns     
This table reports the results from panel regressions of returns calculated using a 
fund's reported holdings as the dependent variable. As such, the dependent 
variable is on a before-fee basis.  Reported coefficients have been annualized, and 
t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  All regressions include time fixed effects.  
Standard error calculations cluster by fund. 
R-squared -0.0262 
  
 
(2.35)** 
  
    # of S&P stocks/Total # of stocks in fund 
 
-0.0339 
 
  
(3.16)*** 
 
    Value-weight % of mutual fund 
  
-0.0311 
   
(2.83)*** 
    Log assets -0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0004 
 
(0.56) (0.28) (0.16) 
    Turnover 0.0497 0.0710 0.0721 
 
(0.96) (1.38) (1.40) 
    1/number of stocks 0.4456 0.5728 0.5488 
 
(1.34) (1.70) (1.63) 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.4: Dependent Variable: CRSP Raw Returns   
This table reports the results from panel regressions using CRSP raw returns as 
the dependent variable. Reported coefficients have been annualized, and t-
statistics are shown in parentheses.  All regressions include time fixed effects.  
Standard error calculations cluster by fund. 
Panel A: Before Fees       
    R-squared -0.0274 
  
 
(2.56)** 
  
    # of S&P stocks/Total # of stocks in fund 
 
-0.0468 
 
  
(4.16)*** 
 
    Value-weight % of mutual fund 
  
-0.0442 
   
(3.82)*** 
    Log assets -0.0042 -0.0032 -0.0027 
 
(1.82)** (1.36) (1.15) 
    Turnover 0.1194 0.1419 0.1435 
 
(2.54)** (3.00)*** (3.03)*** 
    1/number of stocks 0.1559 0.3140 0.2827 
 
(0.50) (0.99) (0.89) 
    Panel B: After Fees       
    R-squared -0.0248 
  
 
(2.32)** 
  
    # of S&P stocks/Total # of stocks in fund 
 
-0.0436 
 
  
(3.88)*** 
 
    Value-weight % of mutual fund 
  
-0.0412 
   
(3.56)*** 
    Log assets -0.0034 -0.0024 -0.0020 
 
(1.46) (1.02) (0.83) 
    Turnover 0.1137 0.1341 0.1356 
 
(2.42)** (2.83)*** (2.86)*** 
    1/number of stocks 0.1179 0.2639 0.2346 
  (0.38) (0.83) (0.74) 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.5: Dependent Variable: CS Benchmark Excess Returns   
This table reports the results from panel regressions using characteristic-selectivity 
benchmark excess returns as the dependent variable. Reported coefficients have 
been annualized, and t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  All regressions include 
time fixed effects.  Standard error calculations cluster by fund. 
Panel A: CRSP Before Fees       
R-squared -0.0125 
  
 
(1.99)** 
  
    # of S&P stocks/Total # of stocks in fund 
 
-0.0465 
 
  
(6.87)*** 
 
    Value-weight % of mutual fund 
  
-0.0471 
   
(6.82)*** 
    Log assets -0.0021 -0.0009 -0.0003 
 
(1.61) (0.65) (0.22) 
    Turnover 0.0871 0.0980 0.0997 
 
(2.87)*** (3.24)*** (3.30)*** 
    1/number of stocks 0.1820 0.3094 0.2836 
 
(0.85) (1.43) (1.32) 
    Panel B: CRSP After Fees       
R-squared -0.0099 
  
 
(1.58) 
  
    # of S&P stocks/Total # of stocks in fund 
 
-0.0433 
 
  
(6.39)*** 
 
    Value-weight % of mutual fund 
  
-0.0441 
   
(6.37)*** 
    Log assets -0.0013 -0.0001 0.0005 
 
(0.97) (0.06) (0.35) 
    Turnover 0.0813 0.0901 0.0918 
 
(2.69)*** (2.98)*** (3.03)*** 
    1/number of stocks 0.1440 0.2593 0.2355 
  (0.67) (1.20) (1.09) 
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Table 3.5 (Cont)       
Panel C: Holdings-Based Returns       
R-squared -0.0113 
  
 
(1.92)* 
  
    # of S&P stocks/Total # of stocks in fund 
 
-0.0335 
 
  
(5.49)*** 
 
    Value-weight % of mutual fund 
  
-0.0340 
   
(5.45)*** 
    Log assets 0.0008 0.0016 0.0020 
 
(0.59) (1.28) (1.60) 
    Turnover 0.0174 0.0270 0.0283 
 
(0.58) (0.93) (0.97) 
    1/number of stocks 0.4718 0.5683 0.5497 
  (2.18)** (2.57)** (2.50)** 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.6: Dependent Variable: CRSP Four-Factor Model Excess Returns 
This table reports the results from panel regressions using CRSP four-factor 
model excess returns as the dependent variable. Reported coefficients have 
been annualized, and t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  All regressions 
include time fixed effects.  Standard error calculations cluster by fund. 
Panel A: Before Fees       
R-squared -0.0020 
  
 
(0.54) 
  
    # of S&P stocks/Total # of stocks in fund 
 
-0.0094 
 
  
(2.32)** 
 
    Value-weight % of mutual fund 
  
-0.0085 
   
(2.06)** 
    Log assets -0.0014 -0.0011 -0.0011 
 
(1.83)* (1.48) (1.38) 
    Turnover -0.0127 -0.0110 -0.0107 
 
(0.70) (0.61) (0.59) 
    1/number of stocks -0.1691 -0.1445 -0.1514 
 
(1.45) (1.22) (1.28) 
    Panel B: After Fees       
R-squared 0.0007 
  
 
(0.19) 
  
    # of S&P stocks/Total # of stocks in fund 
 
-0.0063 
 
  
(1.56) 
 
    Value-weight % of mutual fund 
  
-0.0055 
   
(1.34) 
    Log assets -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 
(0.71) (0.43) (0.38) 
    Turnover -0.0184 -0.0188 -0.0186 
 
(1.01) (1.03) (1.02) 
    1/number of stocks -0.2065 -0.1941 -0.1990 
 
(1.77)* (1.64) (1.68)* 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.7: Dependent Variable: CRSP Market-Model Excess Returns 
This table reports the results from panel regressions using CRSP market-model 
excess returns as the dependent variable. Reported coefficients have been 
annualized, and t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  All regressions include 
time fixed effects.  Standard error calculations cluster by fund. 
Panel A: Before Fees       
R-squared 0.0164 
  
 
(3.72)*** 
  
    # of S&P stocks/Total # of stocks in fund 
 
0.0156 
 
  
(3.44)*** 
 
    Value-weight % of mutual fund 
  
0.0169 
   
(3.63)*** 
    Log assets -0.0033 -0.0035 -0.0038 
 
(3.70)*** (3.99)*** (4.26)*** 
    Turnover 0.0866 0.0735 0.0728 
 
(4.08)*** (3.48)*** (3.44)*** 
    1/number of stocks -0.3357 -0.4031 -0.3961 
 
(2.55)** (3.06)*** (3.02)*** 
    Panel B: After Fees       
R-squared 0.0152 
  
 
(3.28)*** 
  
    # of S&P stocks/Total # of stocks in fund 
 
-0.0001 
 
  
(0.03) 
 
    Value-weight % of mutual fund 
  
0.0006 
   
(0.13) 
    Log assets -0.0035 -0.0033 -0.0033 
 
(3.87)*** (3.62)*** (3.66)*** 
    Turnover 0.1107 0.0989 0.0989 
 
(4.94)*** (4.44)*** (4.43)*** 
    1/number of stocks -0.3855 -0.4156 -0.4169 
 
(2.90)*** (3.09)*** (3.11)*** 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.8: Dependent Variable: Holdings-Based Returns   
This table reports the results from panel regressions of returns calculated using 
a fund's reported holdings as the dependent variable. As such, the dependent 
variable is on a before-fee basis.  Reported coefficients have been annualized, 
and t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  All regressions include time fixed 
effects.  Standard error calculations cluster by month. 
R-squared -0.0262 
  
 
(0.81) 
  
    # of S&P stocks/Total # of stocks in fund 
 
-0.0339 
 
  
(0.82) 
 
    Value-weight % of mutual fund 
  
-0.0311 
   
(0.73) 
    Log assets -0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0004 
 
(0.59) (0.31) (0.17) 
    Turnover 0.0497 0.0710 0.0721 
 
(0.90) (1.19) (1.21) 
    1/number of stocks 0.4456 0.5728 0.5488 
 
(1.78)* (2.28)** (2.24)** 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.9: Dependent Variable: CS Benchmark Excess Returns   
This table reports the results from panel regressions using characteristic-selectivity 
benchmark excess returns as the dependent variable. Reported coefficients have been 
annualized, and t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  All regressions include time fixed 
effects.  Standard error calculations cluster by month. 
Panel A: CRSP Before Fees       
R-squared -0.0125 
  
 
(2.32)** 
  
    # of S&P stocks/Total # of stocks in fund 
 
-0.0465 
 
  
(5.00)*** 
 
    Value-weight % of mutual fund 
  
-0.0471 
   
(5.00)*** 
    Log assets -0.0021 -0.0009 -0.0003 
 
(1.58) (0.62) (0.20) 
    Turnover 0.0871 0.0980 0.0997 
 
(2.90)*** (3.37)*** (3.41)*** 
    1/number of stocks 0.1820 0.3094 0.2836 
 
(0.85) (2.08)** (1.93)* 
    Panel B: CRSP After Fees       
R-squared -0.0099 
  
 
(1.84)* 
  
    # of S&P stocks/Total # of stocks in fund 
 
-0.0433 
 
  
(4.66)*** 
 
    Value-weight % of mutual fund 
  
-0.0441 
   
(4.68)*** 
    Log assets -0.0013 -0.0001 0.0005 
 
(0.95) (0.06) (0.33) 
    Turnover 0.0813 0.0901 0.0918 
 
(2.71)*** (3.08)*** (3.13)*** 
    1/number of stocks 0.1440 0.2593 0.2355 
 
(1.03) (1.75)* (1.61) 
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Table 3.9 (Cont) 
   Panel C: Holdings-Based Returns       
R-squared -0.0113 
  
 
(1.91)* 
  
    # of S&P stocks/Total # of stocks in fund 
 
-0.0335 
 
  
(3.19)*** 
 
    Value-weight % of mutual fund 
  
-0.0340 
   
(3.19)*** 
    Log assets 0.0008 0.0016 0.0020 
 
(0.53) (1.19) (1.50) 
    Turnover 0.0174 0.0270 0.0283 
 
(0.77) (1.24) (1.29) 
    1/number of stocks 0.4718 0.5683 0.5497 
  (3.13)*** (3.72)*** (3.62)*** 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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CONCLUSION 
Finance research can be divided into two types: theoretical work and empirical work.  
This dissertation is a compilation of essays of the latter type.  Each chapter represents an 
empirical study on a different topic in finance.  The first chapter comes to the conclusion that 
mergers create value for the acquirers‘ shareholders.  Empirical methods in the first chapter 
include OLS regression, univariate and bivariate analysis, and matching estimators in an event 
study setting.  The second chapter finds overreaction in the short-term option market and 
develops trading strategies to take advantage of the mispricing.  This analysis is done in both 
event time and calendar time and uses risk measures such as option delta and Sharpe ratios.  The 
third chapter finds that active mutual fund managers add value over a passive index, and that 
closet index funds are not good investments.  The main empirical method is panel regressions, 
with time fixed effects and standard errors calculated using two different ways of clustering.  
Several different ways of benchmarking returns are compared in this setting.  Taken together, 
these essays can be considered a diversified portfolio of finance topics and empirical methods.   
 
